LCS  – Little Crappy Ship

LCS – Little Crappy Ship

LCS is one of US DoDs pet projects. A floating version of F-35, it was an attempt to make an affordable ship capable of doing almost every mission that surface warship could be expected to do – except maybe imitating submarines or transforming into a mecha-Cthulhu and rolling inland to take out a set of targets by sheer power of awesome. And no, Mr. Hagel, this is not a challenge. Major arguments used to defend it are, like with F-35, economic benefits and not miltary usefulness. Instead of picking a better design, or better yet incorporating good characteristics of each design into new ship, it was decided that both designs will go into production – allegedly to increase production rate and decrease cost by making contractors paranoid about getting dumped in case one of them decreases cost and other doesn’t. But either variant is hard to cancel due to political consequences of one of shipyards loosing the work share.

LCS is supposed to clear out mines, hunt submarines, interdict drug traffic, provide humanitarian relief. It is assumed that it will be capable of performing all these missions effectively due to modules which will enable ship to change between mission-specific configurations – something already done by Denmark. But it seems more and more to be like seagoing variant of F-35.

For starters, LCS is – like the F-35 – riddled with problems. Each LCS costs 440 million USD, but both are plagued with cracs and corrosion. Costs are likely to increase as numbers are cut. Ships have problems with guns, and carry helicopters incapable of defending them from submarines. On LCS-1, something failed, on average, two out of every three days. It had 80 systems failures during 60-day maiden voyage, and it is suffering cracks that limit it to 15-20 knots depending on state of the sea – well below 45-50 knots stated as its top speed. And this top speed requirement came at heavy price, being responsible for almost all issues to be discussed (and when asked about it, Navy admirals only said that „speed is life“. People, LCS is not a scout aircraft, it is warship, and speed, though useful for helping ship deal with enemy missiles, cannot replace good armament or sound design. If you disagree, take a look at how entire „battlecruiser“ concept turned out for British.). Worse, many cracks on one side of the ship are mirrored by cracks on the opposite side of the ship, indicating that cause of these cracks are design issues. All four engines have failed on both voyages it made, and shaft seals failed, leading to flooding. On May 21, USS Freedom (LCS-1) had to return to port soon after leaving due to sediment in lube oil system, and it also had problems with seawater leaking into the system, with air conditioning systems and with large number of civilian contractors assigned to it in order to fix problems. And like the F-35, large number of units are planned to be acquired long before testing is complete. In May 2012, the US Navy report disclosed that the ship had failed 14 of 28 inspection tests. 30 mm and 57 mm guns have reliability problems, including possibility of going offline while ship is travelling at high speeds – which means that ship designed to rely on high speed to survive has reduced fighting capability exactly at these speeds. Torpedo radar doesn’t function, leaving it defenseless against submarines while in littoral waters.

But even if all problems are solved (technically, first two ships are prototypes, that is R&D vessels), it will – like the F-35 – be a very ineffective weapon. Both LCS versions are unsurvivable, being designed to outrun threats – but this tactic is not valid due to their size, far larger than Swedish Visby class. Namely, LCS displaces around 3.000 tons, whereas Visby displaces 640 tonnes. Yet only threat LCS might handle effectively are swarms of RPG-armed pirates in inflatable boats – and any US Coast Guard cutter can do that. It does not have equipment for anti-submarine warfare, relying instead on already-mentioned helicopters which themselves aren’t much more useful in that mission.

LCS can carry two H-60 helicopters or four MQ-8B drones helicopter drones, or some mix of these (1 helicopter and 2 drones an usual mix) as well as surface and sub-surface drones. Current modules in development are for mine warfare (MIW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and anti-surface warfare (ASUW). MIW and ASW modules are simply sensors with drone- or helicopter- -launched weapons, and ASUW module is specialized for defeating speedboats, offering only two 30 mm guns and 45 Griffin missiles. Permanent armament consists of 57 mm automatic gun, 4 .50-cal machine guns and close missile defense system. As US Navy is planning procurement of 52 LCSs and 64 mission packages (16 ASW, 24 MCM, 24 SUW), there is actually very little advantage to LCS’ modularity. However, since planned number of ships is unlikely to be built, modules might provide advantageous – assuming that number of modules is not cut.

Comparatively, Visby class carries heavier armament than LCS – 57 mm gun, 8 anti-ship missiles and 4 torpedo tubes; compare to LCSs 57 mm gun, 4 .50 cal machine guns, 2 30 mm guns (Freedom-only) and up to 45 miniature missiles only capable of handling small torpedo boats (these missiles are arguably a good idea, but not if they’re intended as heaviest armament on a warship – unless said warship is planned as a COIN ship). Visby also has a helicopter pad and can reach 35 knots. It is also very hard to detect on radar (though this characteristic is of questionable utility in both ships as submarines are greatest danger to surface vessels).

Even British Type 26 frigate is expected to cost half as much as LCS, while being outfitted with cruise missiles, helicopters, submersibles, and being able to carry out all missions associated with LCS. Russian Stereguschy class frigate is, at 2.200 tons, 30% smaller than LCS and costs 20-25% as much at most, yet it carries 100 mm automatic gun, 14.5 mm machine guns, Gattling-type CIWS, S-400 medium-range SAMs, SS-N-25 anti-ship missiles – which, while subsonic and shorter-ranged than Harpoon are considered more capable than Griffin – 533 mm anti-ship torpedoes, 324 mm anti-submarine torpedoes and a helicopter. Chinese Houbei class fast attack boats cost 40 million USD and displace 220 tons, yet they carry missiles that outrange any weapon that LCS has.

It was expected to cut costs by having a relatively small crew, but Navy had to add sailors as crewmembers’ workload was too exhausting at planned crew levels. Which is a good idea even without factoring in exhaustion, as damage control on a ship is manpower-intensive – “advanced technology” simply can’t replace personnel. This however means reducing its speed, which is supposedly a key to ship’s survivability. It also can’t swap weapons quickly. And while its armament is only capable of handling already-mentioned small boats, it is not survivable even against these, as it is built to commercial standards in effort to cut costs.

Modules, another cost-cutting measure, were intended to be swappable within day or a two – instead, process can take weeks. This idea however was already successfully implemented in European navies – like Danish Navy’s “Standard Flex” series of weapons modules.

This is not to say than US Navy might not be able to salvage some use for these ships. But they are unlikely to ever reach combat capability of foreign ships of similar or smaller tonnage without heavy rebuilds, and will never provide same capability-for-cost ratio.

As one commenter on a certain forum put it: “LCS is basically a 3,000 ton light frigate that has the armament of a Boston Whaler combined with the sensor outfit of the Staten Island Ferry. However, all of that doesn’t matter because it can go very fast for the ten minutes it takes to run out of fuel.” It is hard to find a better summary of the ship. In actual combat, LCS will be nothing more than a high-speed target (“fast food”) for enemy ships and submarines. But it remains in production due to political clout of contractors producing LCS variants, both of which employ large numbers of people in important industries and districts.

And apparently most news are so bad that US Navy has to be forced to give information on LCS. Not that it is the only Western ship with crapload of problems, but still. And LCS is only an indication of greater problems in US military procurement: no ship since Adams class DDG met design and contract specifications; Spruance class, though coming close, still required modifications and CG 47 required concrete poured into lower parts of the ship in order to be stable enough as to be seaworthy. Similarly, USAF was only saved by Boyd and acolytes, and even then F-15 turned out somewhat overweight and F-16 got definetly overweight, and as of F-16C filled with useless AtG equipment (you want AtG, take A-10 or F-15E).

113 thoughts on “LCS – Little Crappy Ship

  1. I enjoy this blog. I have added it to my favorites.

    On the LCS you might want to be a little more guarded. The Navy has its own internal politics and many of the surface officers that blog negatively about the LCS are very much blind to its unique attributes and too focused on making comparisons with other ships that are simply different such as the VISBY (smaller) or the TYPE 26 (larger).

    The module concept of the LCS is what makes it unique. Other ships that brag about modularity are not talking about the same thing. Almost all ships today are designed so the sailors can fight them. In other words one ship will fight another. Here with the LCS you have a vehicle for fighting another ship with upgradable off-board weapons that are autonomous and separate from the ship itself in a way similar to what aircraft carriers or helicopter carriers do. The LCS is very different and has the potential to keep the ship safe in environments where neither the VISBY or the Type 26 could possibly operate safely today.

    Not that all is perfect with the LCS. Close to land protection against aircrafts is really important and I do not think it has enough but I have faith that many of these shortcoming will be corrected over time.

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      1. They are unique in concept as far as the Navy is concerned. I have also read interviews where UK Navy people say so too and indicate that it is a new and very attractive way to carry out these tasks. In particular the counter mine warfare.

        The ship is really something like a bus. The large mission bay is the new key design feature that facilitate the use of the mission modules. Not a new feature but still important is the large landing area and hangar with the two helicopters and the drone. This ship has more space for the type of weapons that the Navy expects to used when it operates in the fringes of the USA influence which are mostly littoral waters and confined seas.

        What the USA has at the present to accomplish these missions are Perry frigates (mostly ASW ships with no deck gun) or patrol boats with no helicopters. The Perry is a capable ship but lacks mission bays and other features like the water jets and the high speed. And like I said earlier, the comparison with European ships intended to operate near their home waters is misleading. The Type 26 is a capable ship but it will age poorly compared to an LCS that has had its modules upgraded periodically.These two comments apply to most comparisons.

        Like I said, the ship is not perfect. While mines and quiet diesel subs are statistically the main threats to be found in littoral waters aircrafts are also a very dangerous anti-ship weapon and the LCS must be able to defend itself from them. In confined waters such as those in the Gulf swarms of fast boats armed with short range missiles are an issue but this ship should be able to outrun them as well as fight them with its deck gun.

        Yes, I think it is a good concept.

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      2. Modules are unique in US Navy, but there are ships which were using modules far before LCS. And yes, LCS concept is good, but execution is butchered.

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      3. Butchered is strong word. They are behind on several key modules that are the raison d’être for this vessels and that has been a generator of criticism from several quarters who are promoting their own agendas such as the surface combatant community. The latter are under severe pressure from many quarters such as the naval air and the submarine folks who increasingly take on tasks that used to be theirs and now the LCS too.

        The USA has also used modules before. Several Euro Navies have too and done so very successfully including recently the Danes. But no one has attempted to do it to the extent that this ship is doing it now and if it successful it will be a game changer insofar how they have dealt with these problems in the past. I was just reading yesterday some articles about mine warfare during the Iraq war and how that affected the execution of the war. War ships where placed out of commission by mines. The USA has had problems with mines and submarines dating to world war 1 and 2. Today diesel electric subs are so quiet that they can lay in wait at the mouth or a harbor or any known transit point and turn something like the South China Sea into a Chinese lake. This ship has the potential to break that up from a stand off range.

        There are other things coming along of great interest such as the “Off-shore Floating Bases” that will combine with the LCS and other Navy and Marine-infantry assets to give the USA flexibility in those areas that we are talking about. See this link…

        http://gcaptain.com/sneak-peak-us-navys-new-mobile-landing-platform-usns-montford-point/

        The USA has been experimenting with commercial container ships and landing ships such as the USN Ponce in developing the concept for these off-shore floating vessels. They will be like having a tine but efficient base where none are available. It is going to be interesting.

        By the way… I love your web site. It is very nice.

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  2. The LCS is the product of a competition between two companies that each had the US Navy by the balls, which ended in the Navy buying BOTH competitors. If this policy wasn’t a double-standard, the US military would have the F-32 in development as a combat aircraft, along with the F-35. We would have both the Chrysler and GM designs for the M1 Abrams. We would have both the M16 and the AR-18. We would have both the LAV I and the LAV-300. And we would be broke (which the precedent set by this action is propelling us).

    As for the rest of this post, I’m literally cut-and-pasting information from an earlier blog post I made on this disaster.

    The short description of the LCS is as follows.

    It’s a replacement for ALL US Navy Minesweepers that…
    – Failed it’s blast-worthiness test.
    – Has a metallic hull (sets-off magnetic-influenced mines), unlike it’s wooden predecessors.
    – Has a 3000-ton+ displacement, unlike it’s >1000-ton predecessors.
    – Has no minesweeping equipment, nor provisions for any.
    – Has no sonar.
    – Has a helipad to “piggy-back” a helicopter, but no hangar to carry one for the long-haul.
    – Is intended to barrel through the water at 50kts (subtlety!).

    It’s a sub-hunter that…
    – Has no sonar.
    – Has no ASuW weapons.
    – Has a helipad to “piggy-back” a helicopter, but no hangar to carry one for the long-haul.
    – Undoubtedly makes a f***-ton of noise thanks to it’s speed requirement.

    It’s a shore-bombardment vessel that…
    – Has no naval land-attack missile system.
    – Has a teeny-tiny 57mm gun meant to repel aircraft and police light watercraft.
    – Has an even tinier gun than what it replaces.
    – Has no armor to survive rounds from the tanks and artillery that will hit it.
    – Is meant to speed through the water, mad as the dickens (BAD idea in obstacle-ridden coastal waters).
    – Has no CIWS system.

    It’s a Frigate replacement that…
    – Has no sonar.
    – Has no ASuW weapons.
    – Has a helipad to “piggy-back” a helicopter, but no hangar to carry one for the long-haul.
    – Is armed more like an OPV than a Corvette — lat alone a Frigate.
    – Has an even tinier gun than what it replaces.
    – Has dismal endurance, unlike what it replaces.
    – Is meant to go twice as fast as a typical Frigate, because… smiley-face!
    – Has no anti-ship missiles.
    – Has no CIWS system.
    – Has no acoustic ECMs.

    It’s a networked vessel that…
    – Is to operate in environments teeming with electronics noise and interference — both natural and man-made.
    – Will invariably face extremely heavy jamming, precluding the use of any Network-Centric Warfare at all.
    – Operates in extremely cramped, complex, and often uncharted waters, where the LAST thing a skipper needs is being “commanded” every couple of seconds.

    Finally, for those of you who still think that the 50-knot speed requirement is anything other than insane, here are some photographs of “Littoral” waters — the environment the LCS’ very name purports it to be meant for use in;

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    1. Blacktail, I have to reply to this… because it is so inaccurate I have no idea where to start. Almost everything is wrong.

      For example, the gun. The “official” USA frigate is a Perry. The Perry does not have a gun. It had a single arm missile launcher with a 40 missile magazine. Sounds impressive? Sure until you find out that when the single arm launcher broke down the ship could not use any of the missiles and then you find out that the launcher spent more time broken or malfunctioning than operational. Eventually it was eliminated all together and on some frigates replaced with a very small deck gun. So the Perry did not have a gun or missiles. The LCS does.

      Submarine hunting. Littoral submarines can’t be found using listening sonar. They are too quiet and the littorals are too noisy. You have to ping them and if you do that you give yourself away. Off board modules that can do the hunting for submarines would be better but there is no ship in the USA other than the LCS and large amphibious ships that can comfortably operate modules. The LCS is intended to free up those amphibious ships from those tasks. By the way, midget submarines like those the North Korean operate are very hard to find and off board modules offer a path forward in fighting those too.

      Helicopters. These ships are not like you suggest lily pad type operators of helicopters like the Navy’s catamaran are. Both versions of the LCS have hangars with the mono hull having a larger one than the trimaran. They both can accommodate two helicopters and one drone and other combinations. That is the normal complement of their air wing. The Perry on patrol showed that the helicopter was the most powerful weapon it had against almost all threats except aircraft. Both versions of the LCS have been design assuming that the helicopter is its main weapon and that is why the large landing area.

      Mine warfare. The LCS is not a wooden or plastic hulled mine warfare ship. It is not intended to replace those yet. But it is intended to do for example, if the Iranians mined the strait of Hormuz the LCS could rush there quickly and with in three to twenty days or so open up a narrow pathway in the mine field and get oil tankers moving through it again PLUS it can prevent the Iranians from maintaining and defending the mine field with their small fast boats and the likes which by the way they have done in the past. The wooden and plastic mine clearing ships that you are talking about can’t do this, they are too slow to arrive quickly and do not stand a chance against fast patrol boats.

      Swarm boat attacks. The LCS can defend itself from swarm tactics in restricted waters. It might surprise you to know that a 5″ gun would have a difficult time disabling a fast boat at full range. That is because by the time the shell has traveled that far the fast boat has moved so much and in such an erratic way that it will evade the shell. And in constrained littoral waters the larger ship might not be able to maneuver itself out of the way. The Iranians have done this and literally run circles around a warship moving down a channel. And when the small boats approach the larger ship from two opposite directions the chance of escape is diminished greatly. Swarm tactics in the gulf are a problem.

      So as you can see, the LCS 3″ gun shorter range is not an issue. At a shorter range when the gun will actually be used the higher rate of fire and larger magazine of the 3″ gun is more important than a bigger 5″ shell with a slower rate of fire and much smaller number of shells in its magazine would be depleted much faster.

      Constabulary duties. We just had two merchant marine sailors kidnapped in Nigeria. They where working on an off-shore oil field. In that role of paroling and help prevent that sort of thing the LCS is by far the best ship we have to conduct stops, searches and seizures far away from our shore. It has the ways and means to bring to water small 30′ rigid hull crafts, support the search with its deck gun and helicopter, etc. Other ships can do this too but can’t do it as well.

      Speed. Do you realize the importance of speed? The LCS will be operating in waters full of high speed patrol vessels and small missile boats. All of these ships are very fast. A small missile boat needs to be much faster than its target in order to close the distance gap and fire its missiles. The reason for that is that beyond visual range Naval ship-to-ship missiles of the Harpoon type are too heavy so small fast boats can’t carry or fire them but even if they need they might need two or thee salvos of two missiles each to overcome the target’s defense. What small boats do carry are typically smaller short range missiles fired from very short range. Speed to flee is very important for the ship that is being targeted which we will presume it will be the LCS. Speed will also be important when reacting to distress calls or searches or to maneuver around a fast moving task force (we do not have any ship that can do that now).

      You made a lot about the two suppliers but there have been details forgotten. One design is for a sea skimming mono-hull which is Italian technology and the other is for a trimaran hull that is Australian technology. The navy is also interested in Catamarans and fortunately we have very good native technology there. But the navy is is doing all it can to transplant and develop those technologies here to the USA for future use. They are trying to provide a market to both and in doing so not just bring that technology here but also add a little competition to the USA ship building market so they are not as complacent as they are now. Plus let us not forget that two ship yards can produce ships twice as fast and provide redundancy if one fails… so that is also an advantage.

      Beside the above the sea skimming mono hull seems to have the edge in deploying surface and submarine off board vehicles while there is no doubt that the trimaran is better at air-borne vehicles. You might actually want both for different environs.

      I am going to mention this last because it is not the official navy policy but unofficially, until a more specialize ship shows up, the LCS is a great vehicle for small scale Special Forces deployment, underwater demolition teams and the likes. With out it you are back to using the Amphibious ships. This is a subject that is delicate because no country wants a ship close to its shores who’s one of its mission is to deploy special forces teams.

      Drawbacks… the LCS needs more protection from air threats and an over the horizon surface to surface missile. They are working on the latter. I find it very interesting the trend to smaller less destructive missiles that will produce less collateral damage; it is going on everywhere.

      What is it does not need….

      Torpedoes. Those are for last ditch defense if the Helicopter can’t deal with the threat but again the ship borne torpedoes are heavier and longer than those carried by the helicopter and that complicates logistics. The decision was made to rely on the helicopter and I think it is better.

      Larger deck guns for shore bombardment. Too much collateral damage will prevent the use of Naval guns in many littoral areas. Missiles have proven to be better. For shore bombardment there are other options that the Marines do not want to hear about but unfortunately for them the Navy is done with large deck guns so they have to look for other solutions.

      Sub hunting in open waters. The LCS could do this as well as escort duty but it tends to generates a lot controversy because the ship can’t do it as well as a destroyer or a Perry. But it if necessary the LCS could be rigged with a towed sonar and could do it.

      Anti-ship missiles. The temptation is to provide the LCS with six or eight vertical launchers for this. But if the ship the LCS is trying to sink is so big that you need a Harpoon ship-to-ship missile then you are in great danger and better off deploying its helicopters in defense and fleeing. Plus the Harpoons will take weight and space away from other things that are more necessary.

      What the LCS needs is to keep working with its modules and refining them. The ship does little fighting. The off modules are the ones that do most of the fighting.

      I could go on and on but I think this is enough.

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      1. You’re wrong about pretty much everything HGR. Expect a lengthy rebuttal. Must be nice being a LCS US Navy mouthpiece with your cushy job paid for by MY taxpayer dollars.

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      2. I just saw this post; I do not work for the Navy.

        I sincerely hope your rebutal is worthy of an answer and not something so mis-guided that it is best left alone in a dark corner of the internet.

        The LCS is comming along rather nicely and it is now having its anti-mine modules up-garded.

        Biggest subject of debate among Navy commentators is the apparent supperiority of the 30MM gun against Swarm attacks where previously it was thought that the 57MM was superior. This came out of testing for the Zumwalt. Of course the LCS has a 57MM with more range, larger shell and correspondingly larger kill area so we are all waiting to see why the Navy settled on the 30MM. Anyone knows the details of what is going on with these two guns and can let me know?

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      3. “The LCS is comming along rather nicely”

        And costing several times more than it should for its actual level of capability suggests it should. It is a flawed design, something like Visby- or Kralj- classes would be more than adequate for its stated mission(s).

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      4. “The LCS is comming along rather nicely”

        bahahahaha!!! compared to what?

        You can try and fool me, but it wont be such an easy task. I personally find this offensive since im a taxpayer and am quite frankly sick and tired of this bull manure.

        I would say go ahead and continue this nonsense because there are parts i find amusing, other than the fact that the lives of our men and women are at stake here, and this is becoming something of a minature “torpedo scandal”. Yet the Navy and LCS supporters will continue to ignore facts until bodies are floating in the water…then maybe theyll try to blame the crews.

        Anybody that thinks the LCS is “coming along nicely’ doesn’t deserve the response I was about to give. This conversation is concluded and I think the other points were already refuted just fine.

        The fact stands that it is a miserable failure for mine sweeping, sub-hunting, shore bombardment, frigate duties, and pretty much any other task the thing is supposed to do to justify billions spent. Once again, you cannot have a drag racing cement truck that can haul lumber in the back. You need specialized vessels and crew for such tasks.

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      5. “shore bombardment, frigate duties” – did you add these duties yourself or have you read about them elsewhere?

        I noticed a lot of passion in your post as well as a lot of concern about the good use of your tax payer dollars and while those attributes are admirable I would suggest that you would sound more convincing if you posted some real and RECENT bad news about the LCS.

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      6. It is not the only warship built to civilian standards. And I will add that if built to military standards of any sort it would still be disabled by a missile. And that is the problem with missile warfare… all it takes is one strike to incapacitate all but the largest of vessels.

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      7. It will make difference with small missiles, RPGs, proximity mines and coastal artillery… all of which the LCS is likely to encounter. Warships that are built to civilian standards as a rule are only ones that are not expected to fight in a war and only serve as, essentially, large patrol ships. Example is French Floreal class frigate, that is designed for patrol, humanitarian aid, diplomacy and naval aid enforcement.

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      8. I suppose the shipbuilders in the defense industry probably view it as an opportunity to make more money.

        Considering the problems so far:

        Cracks on both sides of the hull limited the USS Freedom to 20 knots rather than the designated 40 knots (so in other words, the trade off for speed apparently won’t be realized). Whether these have been fixed, they’ve kept silent on it, which to me suggests that things are not going well. There were 17 cracks.
        Between March to July of 2013, there were power outages on the USS Freedom as well.
        There have been several hundred cases of equipment failure.

        Of the two designs, the Independence one is less problem plagued, but it has had serious issues with corrosion.

        The modules too are problem plagued and the GAO has criticized the Navy for not being as forthcoming about problems:

        Click to access 656107.pdf

        The report recommended that the program be frozen (no more orders) until all of the problems can be fixed.

        There are rumors to reduce the buy from 52 to 24 ships, but Navy is fighting for 52:
        http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/01/16/navy-still-expects-to-build-52-ship-lcs-fleet/

        I imagine if they get what they want, money will be cannibalized from better ships.

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      9. “I would suggest that you would sound more convincing if you posted some real and RECENT bad news about the LCS”

        I would suggest you try and convince me that these “old problems” have been solved at all, namely the primary problem of the entire premise behind the LCS.

        Im finished here. And im not sold.

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      10. I am not trying to sell you anything. You are the one that says it does not work and you should bring some recent examples.

        And I do not have to prove what any one who wants to be informed could find out by simply searching for recent news on the LCS and its modules. A lot of the critics you will read including here are repeating deficiencies from 2012 that are already fixed and non-issues. But they have no interest to find out what is really working, where they are having challenges and how things are progressing in general.

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    1. rails guns will NEVER WORK, especially on a Zumwalt. Anybody with any rudimentary knowledge of physics in relation to recoil will be able to conclude this.

      Just like radar stealth, “one size fits all”-weapon systems, and lasers, railguns are unicorn lala-land fantasies that will never ever work even marginally, let alone on the par their supporters say they will.

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      1. That depends on how powerful rail gun is, main advantage of rail guns as I understand it is not in the firepower vs chemically propelled kinetic impactors but rather in the fact that you don’t need chamical agents that might blow you up in order to use them. Of course, depending on how electricity required is generated, that may or may not be helpful…

        Problem with rail guns is rather excessive wear from use, as it combines friction and electricity (both generate heat and wear down barrel). IIRC, current rail guns have to have their barrels replaced every 2 or 3 shots.

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      2. Right… wear and tear of the rail. The rails gets out of line with heat, etc. this is the main technical challenge. Ideally the gun needs to fire in salvoes for maximum effectiveness so this is a problem that needs to be solved.

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      3. My primary complaints against them is

        1.) the astronomical recoil they produce. Think something that exceeds the recoil energy of a Iowa-class 16 inch gun! The Zumwalt supposedly already has issues with bouyancy.
        2.) The fact that they can only fire ferrous projectiles, which are inevitably unguided
        3.) No amount of velocity is going to create kinetic energy value on the target compared to, say, HE rounds from conventional guns. This means they are only conceptually useful for punching the armor of other naval vessels and maybe the odd surface target, which can be killed with missiles and guns anyways that are far less troublesome.
        4.) Astronomical energy required to fire them

        But that is just me. Maybe its because im biased in favor of more simple and reliable weapons??? 😉

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      4. “1.) the astronomical recoil they produce. Think something that exceeds the recoil energy of a Iowa-class 16 inch gun! The Zumwalt supposedly already has issues with bouyancy.”

        Yes, that is an issue. Though my understanding is that rail gun is more meant for penetration, that is a small high speed projectile producing large amount of kinetic force per square unit of area being hit while still having about same total recoil as classical large-calibre guns. In that aspect it is indeed workable as a concept, however there are issues: namely, modern ships are so thin-skinned that there is a possibility of round going through them without doing much damage. There should be some live fire testing done against ships being decomissioned before rail guns are introduced.

        “2.) The fact that they can only fire ferrous projectiles, which are inevitably unguided”

        Unguided weapons are typically more reliable than guided ones, though. Especially against small, maneuverable targets – guided missiles have shown themselves quite useless against Israeli fast attack boats.

        Another issue is astronomical price – ship using a rail gun is likely to be nuclear-powered.

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      5. I suspect that for an electrically powered gun to work:

        The projectile as it exits that gun will not be able to touch the barrel – or else the wear problems will be huge. Here the technical problems are immense. Either materials sciences has to advance, or this problem will restrict the key advantage of rail guns – their muzzle velocity.
        Not having any explosive is not really a drawback. At the speeds we are talking about, the kinetic energy would exceed the chemical energy released by any explosives. I am not sure a guided projectile would be as advantageous as they are advertised to be. Historically guided missiles and bombs have been problem plagued. Rail guns are traveling at rocket or scramjet velocities, so there’s much smaller margins for error in the guidance system.

        Imagine if this were used as shore bombardment. Like strategic bombing, it may end up killing a lot of civilians. Early battleships had the problem of guns hitting their targets (as the Battle of Jutland illustrated). The rail gun, with its much higher velocity would share that problem.

        What is a drawback though is providing enough electricity. I suspect that only a large platform will be able to fire one, unless something very energy dense that creates a lot of energy very quickly (ex: a chemical explosive … but that takes away the advantage of the rail gun in that regard or a nuclear reactor that stores up energy since they are not good at rapidly building up energy) can provide it. Compounding this is the recoil and only a very large platform will be able to take it.

        Are these problems insurmountable? Perhaps in a few decades we’ll see.

        But that’s not really the issue here. The issue here is that the US thinks that rail guns and other super high tech weapons systems are going to solve the problems that it faces. War of course, does not work that way, and even if they got a rail gun working with its limitations, there’s a very high probability it would not be the war winner they thought it was.

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      6. ” At the speeds we are talking about, the kinetic energy would exceed the chemical energy released by any explosives.”

        Problem is that modern ships are thin-skinned, so it is entirely possible for projectile to go through the ship without doing much damage. Of course, shore bombardment is far more relevant task (submarines are primary anti-ship weapons), so it should be seen how well would rail gun perform in that role.

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      7. One other issue. The reliability of the rail gun could be a problem as well. They will undoubtedly be very sophisticated systems.

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      8. With rail guns re-coil is not a problem. The two problems are power generation and tear and wear of the rail itself.

        You guys are right when you say that Its projectile will indeed go right through the superstructure of the ship… to damage it it will have to hit it in the engine area, etc. That is already been thought.

        But if you use it against a missile while it is being accelerated and its skin is subject to very high stresses any puncture or break in it could destroy the entire missile. If fired in rapid salvoes it will be a deadly antiarcraft weapon with out the cost.

        No guidance is possible for the rail gun’s shell. the acceleration is too high. We have nothing that can handle that. At least for now.

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      9. “If fired in rapid salvoes it will be a deadly antiarcraft weapon with out the cost.”

        True, but there are still limits for that (heating, wear and tear, ability to quickly cycle the action)… coil gun might be better for rapid-fire weapons.

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      10. “Yes, that is an issue”

        Not only is it a ‘issue’, but it completely prevents rail guns from being attached to, say, the Zumwalt.

        “Though my understanding is that rail gun is more meant for penetration, that is a small high speed projectile producing large amount of kinetic force per square unit of area being hit while still having about same total recoil as classical large-calibre guns.”

        Thats not even remotely true

        The similar argument applies to sabot AT rounds. No amount of velocity and penetration ability will create “explosive” effects, or else HEAT, HE, and a plethora of other 120mm ammunition development in order to defeat soft skinned targets and obstacles, would be undergoing testing and fielding.

        Similarly, there is no feasible way rail guns, firing their projectiles at hyper velocities, will be able to create an equivalent “explosive” effect on targets in the same matter, say 16 inch guns made…or 8 inch guns for that matter. whatever. rail guns can only fire ferrous projectiles. Guided or HE type theoretical designs are a physical impossibility.

        They will have immense penetration, no doubt about that. Can they cause damage to ships and some surface targets? no doubt. But what you are suggesting violates the very laws of physics itself. and it is an very extensive and troublesome PITA when compared to guns or missiles. Kind of like hunting with silver bullets when lead or copper suffices just fine.

        “Unguided weapons are typically more reliable than guided ones, though. Especially against small, maneuverable targets – guided missiles have shown themselves quite useless against Israeli fast attack boats.”

        I can agree with that to an extent. The sophistication of your guidance is entirely dependent on its effectiveness, although, the relative inexpense of unguided makes them very desirable. In fact, the US has too much emphasis on “guided” anything in my opinion.

        “But if you use it against a missile while it is being accelerated and its skin is subject to very high stresses any puncture or break in it could destroy the entire missile. If fired in rapid salvoes it will be a deadly antiarcraft weapon with out the cost”

        Yeah theoretically

        What fire control system exists that allows us to do that? once again, we are back to square zero with rail guns.

        Furthermore, you are AGAIN, attempting to hunt with silver bullets.

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      11. The rail gun will have many applications. It is like the lasers. They will be less expensive than missiles and hopefully you are not suggesting bringing the New Jersey’s 16″ guns back now that the folks at Camden have gotten used to them.

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      12. “But what you are suggesting violates the very laws of physics itself.”

        It doesn’t. 200 kg projectile at 500 mps will have the same kinetic energy (25 MJ) as a 2 kg projectile at 5000 mps. 2 kg projectile however has less frontal area and by concentrating impact force on smaller surface achieves better penetration (like subcaliber projectiles in sabot rounds).

        That being said, rail guns will face the same problems as battleships did when hitting soft-skinned targets with their main guns… namely, that projectiles completely penetrated target without exploding, and thus only did damage to the area it passed through.

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  3. Does anybody know what the intended purpose of the vessel is?

    It is intended for “littoral combat” presumably, but at the same time, the Navy’s own report suggests that:

    “LCS is not expected to be survivable in a hostile combat
    environment. This assessment is based primarily on a
    review of LCS design requirements, which do not require the
    inclusion of the survivability features necessary to conduct
    sustained operations in its expected combat environment.”

    Click to access 2011lcs.pdf

    Finally, when asked about the issue,

    ““I don’t worry per se about its survivability where I would intend to send it,” Greenert said of the LCS. “You won’t send it into an anti-access area.” That is, the LCS shouldn’t venture into waters where American military “access” is jeopardized by weapons such as shore-based missiles, small attack boats, and mines, the very threat that is the focus of the Navy and Air Force “AirSea Battle” concept.”

    http://breakingdefense.com/2012/04/cno-lcs-couldnt-survive-war-with-china-but-it-can-prevent-one/

    The justification here is that the LCS is to act like some sort of “deterrence”.

    @HGR

    The question is, how many Zumwalts will be built? Assuming they even deliver the promised capabilities (again a pretty big if), will that number be enough to make a difference?

    Remember, at any given time, if you have x number of vessels, a certain number are going to be in maintenance, others in training, and only a few will be deployed.

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    1. “Does anybody know what the intended purpose of the vessel is?”

      No, it was designed first and now US Navy is desperately trying to find some purpose for it.

      “Remember, at any given time, if you have x number of vessels, a certain number are going to be in maintenance, others in training, and only a few will be deployed.”

      Generally, 1/3 to 2/3 of all ships will be unavaliable at any given moment.

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      1. “No, it was designed first and now US Navy is desperately trying to find some purpose for it.”

        So it’s a solution looking for a problem? 😀

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      2. No. This is a ship immerse in enormous inside politics within the Navy. Its designed came to be out of certain threats and environments that legacy Navy ships could not handle well and what was known about the short comings of Frigates’ designs.

        At the end of their life the Perry’s where one of the Navy’s most lightly armed ships in the Navy. This was a courtesy of a design that made weapon systems an integral part of the ship design and up-grading them immensely costly. So the Navy switched to modular weapons. The other problem was that more and more work was being done with off-board vehicles and none of the Frigates could handle them well. And of course the new threats which where asymmetric and located in remote costal areas. So this ship addresses all of these issues but because it is not a carrier of large missiles or a fleet defense type ship or does not have 300 sailors for the captain to command a lot of Navy officers do not like it.

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      3. You two are incorrigible. You send a Tico to the Gulf and if attacked by a swarm of small boats he is supposed to defend himself with what?…. a huge Harpoon missile? We have been needing a ship like the LCS for a while.

        You guys do not follow this but there has been a lot of progress made in Navalizing the Griffin and it is now operational in the Cyclone patrol boat and on the MQ-8B Fire Scout drone that operates from the LCS. This is a small short range missile that will provide defense against those types of boats and can be deployed from the LCS RIM launcher. Soon there will be a beyond the horizon missile.

        Once all the modules are developed it will be quite a little ship.

        Only real problem is its anti-air suite.

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      4. LCS’ problem is that it cannot effectively defend itself from a couple of pirates using RPGs and harsh language. It is so complex it will spend most of its time in dock, and if you need defense against small craft (which you always do) conventional ships armed with 57 / 75 mm guns and anti-ship missiles are better defense.

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      5. Typical MICC then. It was made to make the defense industry wealthy.

        What’s needed is something like what the “Fighter Mafia” did for the Navy.

        It should empahsize the following:
        1. Build small, fast attack boats
        2. Build corvettes
        3. Instead of large nuclear powered aircraft carriers (that are immensely expensive), smaller, escort sized carrier craft should be build, but more of them
        4. Seaplanes should be reintroduced (they are very unrated in their role – they played an important role in both the Battle of the Atlantic against the German U-Boats and in the Pacific; the Axis forces also used them as well)
        5. Build SSKs again (use with SSNs)
        6. Consider some gun based NGFS from a large calibre gun (keep it simple too, not like the current Zulwalt class)
        7. Emphasize anti-mine and mine warfare

        The closest thing I’ve seen to a reformer is Zumwalt, who ironically would not have wanted a vessel like the one named after him.

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      6. Seaplanes?

        Many small ships and corvettes. A poetic proposal but it will not do for a country like the USA. Might be workable for Egypt.

        I would like to make a comment about naval guns and artillery in general. It has improved immensely over the years and it is quite a bit more accurate, effective and economical. From guns to rockets we are seeing them smaller, more accurate and more effective with less of a logistic tail. The problem with Naval fire support for the Marines stems from the range of shore batteries defending those beaches. The days when the assault ships sailed to with in 2 miles of a shore, dropped anchor and then sent some landing crafts in are over never to come back. Most assaults to any beach that is defended by thus will have to take place from some 50 miles away and at great speed. So will the fire support if it is based on the ship also have to take place from at least that range. The old guns will not work.

        The old helicopters will not work either. A loaded helicopter travels at 120 miles per hour and will take 20 minutes to make the trip. Too long. The Osprey’s higher speed is the answer to that. If concentrated fire support is needed to break out of a log-jam at beach we do not have that from surface combatants and we will not likely have it from anything other than carrier aviation.

        And the Zumwalt is an all electric ship. For those who are not familiar that it means it will be ultimately be equipped with a rail gun. Not yet but in the future. That is what all the electricity is needed for. Shoot down missiles and aircrafts.

        The challenges of operating in the open ocean against other fleets have been mastered by the Navy. No problem there. Problem are costal waters and the operations that are routinely carried out there as well as asymmetrical threats that large ships are not able to counter well.

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      7. “Many small ships and corvettes. A poetic proposal but it will not do for a country like the USA. Might be workable for Egypt.”

        Not only is it a poetic proposal, but it is absolutely an essential proposal if a country wants to maintain its status as a viable naval power.

        You see, large numbers of smaller, faster, and less expensive ships armed to the gills with guns and anti-ship missiles are capable of swarming large super carriers and destroyers. This will become even more obvious as missile technology evolves and the overwhelming advantage of super carriers wanes proportionally.

        “The days when the assault ships sailed to with in 2 miles of a shore, dropped anchor and then sent some landing crafts in are over never to come back.”

        This is not necessarily true, especially since the US keeps sticking its nose in the business of nations that aren’t world powers, but third world hellholes that sometimes necessitate an amphibious landing. Think Nigeria or Somalia.

        But, like you said, naval guns are evolving, yes?

        That means technological concepts such as base bleed rounds can radically extend the range of guns. This is also assuming that such guns can be also very conducive for killing other naval vessels.

        “Most assaults to any beach that is defended by thus will have to take place from some 50 miles away and at great speed. So will the fire support if it is based on the ship also have to take place from at least that range. The old guns will not work.”

        In that particular instance, amphibious landings will not work and thomahawk missiels will NOT work. Ever hear of the Chinese DF-21 anti-ship missile series? they have a 1700 kilometer plus operational range. Under those faced circumstances, not only will conventional guns be useless, but so will aircraft carriers essentially and thomahawk missiles.

        ” The Osprey’s higher speed is the answer to that.”

        With all of its inherent problems….(which are a boat load). Furthermore, what other variants of the osprey exist besides troop transports that will be adopted in larger numbers?

        “If concentrated fire support is needed to break out of a log-jam at beach we do not have that from surface combatants and we will not likely have it from anything other than carrier aviation.”

        Like I said before, in those circumstances, probably NOT.

        “And the Zumwalt is an all electric ship. For those who are not familiar that it means it will be ultimately be equipped with a rail gun. Not yet but in the future. That is what all the electricity is needed for. Shoot down missiles and aircrafts. ”

        The rail gun is a wet dream of military theorists that has never been fruitful, and im not convinced it ever will be. It can only be useful for hitting stationary land targets and naval targets. Theoretically it has been hypothesized to be an anti-aircraft and anti-missile weapon BUT, the guidance control systems required of such a magnificent feat are not in existence.

        “The challenges of operating in the open ocean against other fleets have been mastered by the Navy”

        LOL is that why canadian and australian diesel submarines have bragging rights about bagging yankee nuclear submarines and carriers?

        “No problem there. Problem are costal waters and the operations that are routinely carried out there as well as asymmetrical threats that large ships are not able to counter well.”

        and if those ships dont counter those things well, how do you think the objectively less capable LCS will be able to?

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      8. Balais, I do not see a lot worth of comment in your post other than repeat my previous comment that diesel submarines’s feats of markmanship against carriers will not repeat themselves on open waters and that there is such a misunderstanding about the LCS that I feel it is not worth it to explain it again.

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      9. “diesel submarines’s feats of markmanship against carriers will not repeat themselves on open waters”

        In which carriers can’t stay anyway, considering what will they be used for… and considering how many carriers and battleships got sunk by submarines during WWII, in both coastal and open waters, it is quite obvious that diesel submarines will get to sink even nuclear carriers during the war.

        And since Arleigh Burke – a primary carrier escort in the US Navy – is not nuclear-powered, tactical advantages of nuclear carriers are irrelevant. So larger number of small conventional carriers would be a better idea. Something like this:
        http://defenseissues.wordpress.com/2014/09/06/aircraft-carrier-proposal-3/

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      10. “Balais, I do not see a lot worth of comment in your post ”

        Because it contradicts your sales brochure no doubt. /eye roll/

        “will not repeat themselves on open waters”

        hahahaha, yet they previously DID repeat themselves and, given recent naval acquisition trends, they will continue to repeat themselves until the US Navy slides into irrelevance, crippled by the costs associated with their impotent wunderwaffe…or they get systematically sunk by an adversary that actually cares about naval superiority.

        ” and that there is such a misunderstanding about the LCS that I feel it is not worth it to explain it again.”

        Dont mistake my disagreement with ‘not understanding’. I understand the LCS concept QUITE well, its just that i disagree with its idiotic application and your support of it.

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  4. Picard, you have to give it some time. The Griffin is an ideal weapon for what you are describing and it can be used from the ship, the helicopter and now the drone. Same weapon that the Cyclone will uses. Very neat and simple logistics for all of them.

    The gun has certain problems against fast moving boats at maximum range… it takes the shell too long to get there so that by the time it arrives the boat might have maneuvered out of it path. So you have to fire a disperse pattern to improve odds of hitting it and very soon you could end up exhausting the magazine. The smaller Griffin is more accurate and better. This is a good development.

    And you forget that it has the helicopters, the ship also does can do ASW, Anti-Mine and will deploy boarding parties and off-board vehicles. The Frigates that it replaces where not as capable.

    Soon it will have a beyond the horizon system.

    The only real criticism against the LCS are its defenses against aircrafts.

    Even aircraft carriers are escorted into the Gulf by Cyclones… in many places the big ships are defenseless because of space and having weapons that are too large. For those environments you need ships like these.

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    1. “The Frigates that it replaces where not as capable.”

      Define “capability”.

      “For those environments you need ships like these.”

      Heard of missile gunboats?

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  5. Interesting article about the LCS.

    http://news.usni.org/2013/08/21/lcs-mission-packages-the-basics

    This article deals exclusively with the off-board vehicles of which the most important is the helicopter. At least for now.

    Do not mention the Hellfire and Penguin missiles that would extend the defensive range of the helicopter.

    The over the horizon missile is earmarked for 2019.

    No talk about anti-air which I believe needs a lot of improvements.

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  6. My two cents on the matter of the LCS:
    The Russian Bora class corvette is designed for the same job and dose it way better: Same top speed, 3 times less displacement, modular armament that is much more heavy (it can carry at the same time 20 SHORAD missiles, 8 AShM, one 100mm cannon, 2 point defense 6 barreled CIWS cannons, 16 VSHORAD missiles, and short range anti-submarine weapons) and being a sidewalled hovercraft, that on the move submerges only a few centimeters, in water it’s also immune to mines.

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      1. What boggles the mind is that the LCS competion initially had three designs. The third design was a side-walled hovercraft, similar to the Bora, that was much more capable of high speeds then the two “winning designs” and had the same immunity to mines as the Bora. It was rejected from the start I don’t know exactly why (Probablly because it was proposed by the lightweights that are Textron Marine & Land Systems, partnered with EDO Corporation, instead of Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics). Also a side-walled hovercraft being very wide along it’s whole length not just half of it, was much more suited for modularization. And the US had some experinece with this type of craft having build in the seventies twp experimental crafts of this type SES 100A and SES 100B which were used to test several concepts: Side-walled hovercrafts for starters( they achieved speeds of up to 96knots) , waterjet propulsion, supercavitating propellers, automatic ride-control systems and … Vertical Launch Systems. SES 100B was the first US Navy ships to launch a missile (SM2) from a VLS and it did this while “cruising” at 60 knots.
        Another navy that uses side-walled hovercrafts, other then the Russians, is the Norwegian NAVY, with the Skoljd fast attack craft (700 tons, 8 AShM, 57 Bofors for CIWS and AAA and I think some VSHORADs missiles), and two classes of mine sweepers, thus putting to best use the immunity to mines I’m talking about.

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      2. “Probablly because it was proposed by the lightweights that are Textron Marine & Land Systems, partnered with EDO Corporation,”

        That is almost certainly the reason. In US, contracts are given on the basis of bribes and political influence.

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      3. Picard, the USA went abroad and bought technology from the Italians and the Australians to develop these hulls. Those where purchases made outright on merit and being foreign technologies must have had to jump some hurdles internally to happen. I do not see bribes on these types of things.

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    1. Hello Andrei… apples to oranges is an expression that seeks to explain that two things are not equal. This is a costal defense craft and typical of Russian navy practices it is top heavy with armament. They are not the only ones that believe in doing this; the Israelis do too and their ships also tend to be brimming with armament. When you see them they are impressive and rightfully so since that is exactly their strength. But to get a comparison you need to look at what they can’t do.

      It can’t self deploy itself across the Pacific. It does not have an aviation component which is crucial to fight submarines and it has no anti-mine capability. It is not designed to deploy off-board vehicles or fight piracy, do irregular warfare, etc.

      This Russian corvette is really designed to function close to its own shores, do defensive area denial warfare, protect economic assets (fisheries, oil and gas facilities, etc.), patrol littoral waters (anti-smuggling and law enforcement), fend off encroachments by other countries (a growing problem), etc. But it will not do what the LCS can do and vice-versa.

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      1. HGR, even factoring the fact that the LCS must be deployed around the world, for the price of the LCS, it’s badly under-performing, even assuming that it delivered to the advertised capabilities, which it’s currently struggling with.

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      2. Chris, you and Andrei are full of ideas. Here in your last post you are falling on the F-35 price trap again…

        “Two ships of each design would be built on every year between 2011 and 2015. LCS-5 of the Lockheed Martin design had the contractual price of $437 million. Austal USA’s contractual price for LCS-6 was $432 million. Department of Navy Undersecretary Sean Stackley noted in a conversation with reporters on 29 December 2010, that the LCS program was now well within the Congressional cost cap of $480 million per ship. The average per-ship target price for Lockheed ships is $362 million, Stackley said, with a goal of $352 million for each Austal USA ships.” – Wikipedia

        The original goal was about $400 million a ship, half for the vessel proper (the seaframe) and half for the mission modules. The first few LCS, instead, ended up costing $600 to $700 million for the seaframe alone. Now the Navy and the contractors are wrestling the cost per seaframe down to $350 million, still more than promised. But because the mission modules are coming in much cheaper than expected — $100 million for the mine warfare package, $20-$30 million for the others — the average price for a whole ship is back to around the original $400 million. GAO, JULY 2013

        These ships at $400 million are a very good buy. You get 4 ships for the price of one destroyer.

        And because of the mission bays and growth capabilities they will be cheaper to operate in the future than the impossible to upgrade Perrys.

        Now I need to deal with Andrei and his huge post. When you read it he he gives you the impression that hovercrafts are the best thing to have come along since sliced bread.

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    1. Saw the post on the Japanese ship. The LCS was originally derived from the street-fighter concept and was intended to be far smaller than it is today. The overall concept included both smaller ships similar to the Stiletto and Sea Fighter and afloat forward deployed bases which we are already building.

      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Fighter
      http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M80_Stiletto

      The Sea fighter is built around that sort of hull but with out the air cushion.

      This is the afloat forward base…

      http://cno.navylive.dodlive.mil/2012/10/15/afloat-forward-staging-bases/
      http://www.dodbuzz.com/2013/12/10/navy-marine-corps-build-new-sea-basing-ships/

      The LCS while part of the above it came to happen because the Navy wanted to have ships that where self deployable (not dependent on the afloat forward base like the smaller ships would be) and that could replace frigates and minesweepers. From their experience with the Perry they also knew the decisive advantage that helicopters could provide as well as the emerging technologies dealing with the off-board vehicles. The LCS concept grew from there.

      Right now those catamarans that you see in the above links are the basis of what will be developed in future.

      Like

  7. Saw the link. I can’t comment on the specific craft that the Japanese are working on but it looks like a armed variant of this one,

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Fighter

    You need to look at their growing challenges with North Korea and China and the need to QUICKLY from one location to another specially among their Islands or to reinforce South Korea. These very fast crafts can do that. The USA has them as well as others and have already proven their value in these roles.

    Japan is also looking at purchasing an Osprey. This is a far from perfect aircraft that has the distinct advantage of moving at a relatively high speed which is very important in littoral warfare. They will probably end up purchasing a few and man them with a quick reaction force.

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  8. Andrei, saw your new post… the USA experience with hovercrafts does not bade well for such an application as an LCS. They are mechanically complex, have issues with pay-loads and seaworthiness. This Russian vessel you mentioned is operating close to ports where it can be serviced and re-armed. These are just different ships for different uses.

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  9. @HGR

    Before I continue in my reply I have a question to ask, please answer it truthfully so that I know wetter to reply further to you or just limit myself to this post: are you in anyway linked to the LCS program (employee at any of the companies, employee of the US Navy in the program team etc.)?

    “It can’t self deploy itself across the Pacific. ”

    Well neither can any off the two LCS designs not with ranges of 3500 and 4300 nautical miles.

    “It does not have an aviation component which is crucial to fight submarines and it has no anti-mine capability. It is not designed to deploy off-board vehicles or fight piracy, do irregular warfare, etc.”

    True. But you are completely missing the point with that statement. The Bora is offered for export. With the current lessening of restrictions on Iran and their long time collaboration with Russia when it comes to armament, what boat do you think they will buy to defend their coast? The problem is that in about 10 years the LCS will find themselves forced to counter the Bora or a successor of it. Iran is right now negotiating a deal with the Russians to buy a certain type of S-300 SAM batteries that can integrate their already existent S-200 batteries. Is it so far-fetched to imagine a scenario were Iran has an integrated top of the line AA system that integrates not only land based SAM batteries but also the medium range SAM missiles of Bora crafts. A system like this would allow the Bora to use land based radars to aim it’s own missiles and would completely change US SEAD doctrine, forcing USAF aircraft to hunt radars deep in Iran while the launchers are behind them at sea. The only way I see for the US planes to be able to operate with the impunity that they are used to is to first eliminate the Boras and with a deplly integrated AA system the only way to do that would be to send LCS to hunt them. Problem is that LCS has nothing that can sink a Bora while a Bora has 8 AShM that are perfect to take down 3000 ton ships and a superior caliber gun.

    “Saw the link. I can’t comment on the specific craft that the Japanese are working on but it looks like a armed variant of this one,

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea_Fighter

    No it’s not. What the Japanese are working on it’s a Sidewalled Hovercraft, the front skirt is clearly visible. Sea Fighter is a small Small-waterplane-area twin hull https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SWATH a completely different design who’s only advantage is improved stability not speed.

    “Andrei, saw your new post… the USA experience with hovercrafts does not bade well for such an application as an LCS. They are mechanically complex, have issues with pay-loads and seaworthiness. This Russian vessel you mentioned is operating close to ports where it can be serviced and re-armed. These are just different ships for different uses.”

    This post clearly shows that you don’t know much either about hovercrafts or the experience the US has with them. First while they might appear mechanically complex, because of the need to have a mean of inflating the plenum and air-cushion, in reality they are not. The Bora for example uses two auxiliary diesel engines to drive fans to inflate the skirt. That’s the only difference compared to a classic ship. What is so mechanically complex about that? It’s basically an enlarged air-conditioning system, and if you are going to tell me that diesel engines are maintenance intensive and unreliable I’m gonna tell you that you don’t know much about engines either. Other designs don’t even use auxiliary engines, they use propellers driven by the main engine through simple gear-boxes or just the exhaust of the main engine. Other proof of the fact that they are not mechanically complex is that the Russians love them. Currently they are the country with the most experience in hovercraft operation and considering their hatred for anything mechanically complex and hard to repair the fact that hovercrafts are so popular with the all Russian armed services and used with little support in remote areas such as Siberia, the Far North or the deserts of Russia’s south border proves, I think, that hovercrafts are anything but mechanically complex. Also regarding the reliability of hovercrafts I think it’s worth mentioning a little test done by Saunders Roe in the 60s that consisted of a 600 km stroll through Sahara in a hovercraft. They didn’t stop once and the maintenance required at the end was minimal. Now tell me what other vehicle have you hard of going 600 km in a desert and not needing to stop in the middle to clean the filters at least?
    On the issue of payload and seaworthiness the problems are with classical hovercrafts not side-walled hovercrafts. Because they are partially submerged side-walled hovercrafts have seaworthiness equal to or better then other high speed crafts and similar payloads, proof again the Bora that carries heavier armament then many corvette designs in it’s weight class (Visby or Sa’ar 5 for example ) without hampering it’s endurance.
    On the issue of Us experience with hovercrafts also I think you don’t know much. The US used hovercrafts extensively in the Mekong delta during the War in Vietnam, based on this experience and the favorable results obtained then, the two SES 100 prototypes I talked about in my previous posts were commissioned and the LCAC program was started, LCAC that was built by the same Textron Marine Systems which offered the side-walled hovercraft design for LCS, so I think they had enough experience to produce a valid LCS design.

    As I see it a 3000 ton side-walled hovercraft design would have been possible for LCS, as 3000 ton side-walled hovercraft was considered feasible in the 70s when the SES 100A and B prototypes were created so I don’t see why they would not be again in the 2000s. Probably because admiral Zumwalt passed long ago .
    A side-walled hovercraft would have had a number of advantages over the existing LCS designs as follows:
    1) Simpler constructions. It’s practically a pontoon put over two slender hulls. No complicated shaping of the bow required or the complicated hull design of the Independece and Freedom.
    2) Because of point 1) it would have been easier to achieve modularity. Basically the hulls could have been used to house the machinery and anything above that, the pontoon main body a 115x35m rectangle (if we take the length of Freedom and beam of Independence) could have been used to arrange modules. Above this modular bay there would have been the bridge.
    3) Better auxiliary craft and helicopter handling facilities. With a 50x35m flattop,behind the bridge at the rear of the ship there would have been a hell of a lot of room to land and house a helicopter or two. Also because of the width multiple small crafts could have been launched and recovered at the rear with ease.
    4) Better roll-on roll-off facilities. Because of the lack of a classical bow, there could have been roll-on roll-off ramps but at the front and rear off the ship. This would have facilitated loading and unloading of modules and also would have allowed an LCS to land troops directly on the beach like a classical landing-ship (tank) (such a design for a 6000 ton side-walled hovercraft cargo ship capable to land troops and material directly on the beach was proposed by Rohr and Ingalls Shipbuilding)
    5) Better anti-mine warfare capabilities, because the ship would only be something like a foot in water it would be practically immune to mines.
    6) Better anti-submarine warfare capabilities, again because ship would only be something like a foot in water it would be very hard to hit by torpedoes.
    7) Much more efficient high-speed capabilities. While it might seem that a hovercraft is a brute force approach to high speed it’s actually the elegant approach compared to the V-hull of the Freedom and trimaran design of Independence as it takes much less energy to inflate the skirt and lift the ship out of water then it takes to defeat the drag caused by the hull(s) in the other 2 designs. The Bora again as example uses about 10% of available power for lift.

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    1. Andrei, I have not heard anyone say anything different than this about your beloved ship…

      “The Project 1239 Sivuch small missile air cushion ship is primary intended for coast defense operations. These very large surface-effect ship corvettes have proven mechanically unreliable. Completion of these units was much-delayed and they probably are not effective combat units. Two ships in service now – “BORA” and “SAMUM – for Black Sea Fleet of Russian Federation.”

      And I suspect the 12 knot cruising range of 2500 miles with one refueling is without the air cushion, just the catamaran. So it can’t sail with the fleet. Too slow.

      I am not associated with the LCS program. I just recognize its merits as well as being aware that critics will seize any small problem and portrait it as a “deal- breaker”.

      The USA has hovercrafts. They use them for landings, etc. So do the Japanese who have a ton of Islands to take care off. They know what they can do and not do in a combat environment. They are prized for their high speed and ability to land in locations other vessels can’t. I do not think they can move over broken terrain… need to maintain the air cushion. So that is what is good about the regular ones.

      To tell you the truth I am not familiar with these catamarans that can operate as air cushion vessels like these Russian ships do. But if there is any potential for that concept rest assured that the USA already builds damn-good catamarans so we would not need to scramble as much as you think to make one of these. That is IF there is any potential… because they remind me of the hydrofoil craze that years ago seized the Navy; that also went no where. After much tinkering the USA Navy has settled down to catamarans, trimarans and sea skimming hulls for their littoral operations. Air cushion vehicles will be small and for transport. I think they know something.

      Let me go back to the weapons… because you have this backwards… you do not use land radar or what ever to locate a target and then use the ship to fire at them. It is the other way around… say a submarine or patrol vessel locates the enemy. It is the sub or patrol vessel the one that transmit the information to land and who guides the land base missile to the target. Or guides the missile from another ship… the USA Navy does it like that.

      Regarding Iran rest assure that the LCS vessel will not come looking for Boras. It will be the LCS’ off-board vessels that including its helicopters who will. Or the Cyclone patrol crafts. Or if not an LCS then long range maritime patrol aircrafts armed with Harpoons. The Bora will be no one’s salvation in the Gulf. The Gulf waters are very constrained and surface access to the entire body of water can be denied by air power alone. You do not need ships for that. You need them for other things. Think Battle of Brittain and whomever controlled the air above the channel controlled the channel… same here.

      What the Boras can do is operate under land based air cover and patrol the coast. They can extend the range of land based sensors with their own. They can engage vessels that encroach into their sovereign waters but more likely they will issue warnings, board, search and/or bring in to port transgressors and trouble makers. During war they can sail beyond littoral waters to provide radar pickets, investigate sightings, escort transports and barges, protect oil facilities, etc. I do not believe they have a sonar so the assumption must be that no submarines will be around. This and similar are what all of these ships are designed to do assuming the mechanical problems are dealt with.

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  10. “Andrei, I have not heard anyone say anything different than this about your beloved ship…

    “The Project 1239 Sivuch small missile air cushion ship is primary intended for coast defense operations. These very large surface-effect ship corvettes have proven mechanically unreliable. Completion of these units was much-delayed and they probably are not effective combat units. Two ships in service now – “BORA” and “SAMUM – for Black Sea Fleet of Russian Federation.””

    I was speaking of the mechanical reliability of hovercrafts in general and using the Bora as example because it’s one of the few I found data on lift requirements. The problem the Bora has with mechanical unreliability has nothing to do with the design but it’s endemic to the Russian Navy, because of lack of training, parts, and so fort same problem is with Russian submarines (remeber Kursk), cruisers, carrie, destroyer and frigates. If you want to talk about reliability of side-walled hovercrafts Google Skold, Alta and Oksøy classes of the Norwegian navy.

    “I am not associated with the LCS program. I just recognize its merits as well as being aware that critics will seize any small problem and portrait it as a “deal- breaker”.”

    First of all: what merits?
    Second off all: small problems, like the technical unreliability of the first ships that can’t go out to see more then 200 miles without something breaking, and get blocked in Singapore waiting for maintenance?

    “To tell you the truth I am not familiar with these catamarans that can operate as air cushion vessels like these Russian ships do. But if there is any potential for that concept rest assured that the USA already builds damn-good catamarans so we would not need to scramble as much as you think to make one of these. That is IF there is any potential… because they remind me of the hydrofoil craze that years ago seized the Navy; that also went no where. After much tinkering the USA Navy has settled down to catamarans, trimarans and sea skimming hulls for their littoral operations. Air cushion vehicles will be small and for transport. I think they know something.”

    Hydrofoil craze ended not because there was something wrong with them, but because their main promoter inside the US Navy, admiral Zumwalt, retired. Once he retired most off…scratch that all of his pet projects (including side-walled hovercrafts ) got canceled. If you want to know side-walled hovercrafts are pursued as replacements for hydrofoils, because they over the same advantage, high-speed, without the main disadvantage, increased draft. And I didn’t say US was unable to make them on the contrary I talked a lot about the research US had put in them, what I said was that what the US has settled on for littoral warfare (trimarans and whatever) is not the best solution because of the big draft inefficient high-speed performance and lack of true modularity.

    “Let me go back to the weapons… because you have this backwards… you do not use land radar or what ever to locate a target and then use the ship to fire at them. It is the other way around… say a submarine or patrol vessel locates the enemy. It is the sub or patrol vessel the one that transmit the information to land and who guides the land base missile to the target. Or guides the missile from another ship… the USA Navy does it like that.”
    You didn’t get it at all. I was referring just to AA scenarios, specifically how to counter SEAD aircraft, not anti-ship scenarios. In this kind of scenario the ship using it’s own radar would turn it into a target. Staying with the radar turned off and relaying on off board radar, like high powered long range shore based radars about 100 km away from the coast, would allow the craft to maintain a degree of stealth and surprise SEAD aircraft with missile attacks from behind. That is a variation of the tactic F-22 pilots are training to use for BVR engagements, one F-22 stays away with Radar at maximum power and transmitting targeting data to another F-22 that is closer to the target and trying to play… like sneaky, whether it succeeds or not is another story whatsoever.

    “Regarding Iran rest assure that the LCS vessel will not come looking for Boras. It will be the LCS’ off-board vessels that including its helicopters who will. Or the Cyclone patrol crafts. Or if not an LCS then long range maritime patrol aircrafts armed with Harpoons. The Bora will be no one’s salvation in the Gulf. The Gulf waters are very constrained and surface access to the entire body of water can be denied by air power alone. You do not need ships for that. You need them for other things.”

    Again you didn’t get it. The scenario I was offering was for a AA defense of Iran that was so strong as to deny usual American approach of relying on air-power. With an integrated air defense, air-patrol aircraft would be denied entry in the war zone, and helicopter operations would be restricted to an altitude where they would be useless for ASh missions. Thus the US would be forced to rely on Surface Vessels to destroy the forward placed, sea-borne launchers (the patrol ships), before being able to launch proper SEAD missions.
    Now taking into account the time-frame I gave of 10 years in the future when most American naval power would be concentrated in the Pacific to counter China, I think it would be safe to assume that the only naval assets left in the Golf would be LCS and also that there would be very little in the way of USAF assets. These LCS would have to counter the locking of the straits of Hormuz by Iran and would have few USAF aircraft for air-cover, in the initial phases of the crisis. Tell me how do you propose to resolve this scenario: Hormuz strait locked, heavy highly integrated AA defense of Iran, little to no support form USAF, and reinforcements blocked in the Far-East because of Chinese belligerence.

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    1. Andrei, why would you use the land radar to fire and control ship missiles? And I understand what you are saying about the use of the radar but the problem is that the Bora ship will not last… it will be gone. The Iranians might put up a brief battle to protect it and then it will be sunk. it is like putting radars on oil rigs or barges. The Bora is not faster than an aircraft or a helicopter and it will be taken out. This scenario presented is not plausible.

      Iran is the least of my worries… at the present just two aircraft carriers would be required to sweep the Gulf clean of Iranian aircrafts of all types. And that would not include the air forces of neighboring states flying Eurofighters, etc. SAM can be deployed to protect urban areas of high value but who cares about those if what you want to do is open up the strait… what ever is on the way of doing that will be knocked out and everything else will be left alone.

      After that air sweep the surface vessels will move in… you will have to contest with asymmetrical warfare like swarms and pocket submarines, mines, etc. but nothing we have not seen before and we will be better equipped for that now than we have ever been in the past.

      Iran has problems… while its inner cities have strategic depth its oil facilities do not. They are right there at the fringes of their territory and vulnerable. The strait is an international waterway that is also in the fringes. So you are having to protect these facilities that are virtually seconds away from your enemies… it is just not a happy geography for the Iranians. They would like to control both sides of the Gulf (like the Canadians do with the St. Lawrence Seaway) … and everyone else including the Saudis is working hard to keep them from doing that. The Iranians have challenges… you give them too much credit.

      “Now taking into account the time-frame I gave of 10 years in the future when most American naval power would be concentrated in the Pacific to counter China, I think it would be safe to assume that the only naval assets left in the Golf would be LCS” – you must be kidding.

      The problem for the USA with the South China Sea and surrounding areas is that it is all with in reach of Chinese land based aircrafts. So IF there is a conflict moving aircraft carriers in there would be dangerous. Fighting would have to take place from bases in the outer island chains… either land or floating bases. And the F-35 is a good aircraft for that environment. And since you are talking about ten years from now then you will also be talking about drones.

      Andrei, China is not going to be a sea power in ten years… today they are paying the Brazilians to teach them how to handle aircraft carriers… right. The Brazilians are teaching the Chinese. Takes time to build, learn, build again and in the meantime all it takes is one financial crisis and you will stop arming yourself and your military will fall back to human wave attacks and incredible losses. At all moments China’s modern economy is on a knife edge teetering between success and utter failure.

      The actual fight IF it comes be would be a bad fight for China with no second act… But still I do not see this fight happening because I see a weaker than expected China in the future… you can’t continue to build an economy on the flimsy legs they have now. At some point they will have to start paying more for everything or literally choke in smog.

      As far as the air cushion and hydrofoils… they could all be the result of one powerful person in the bureaucracy imposing his will but over time the type of hulls that the USA has leaned towards have been those that I mentioned. If you think a Hydrofoil type is a lot better than that Stiletto or the Swath catamaran you are entitled to that opinion. In my mind the USA they have chosen simpler and more reliable. You say they are wrong and you are entitled to think that.

      “First of all: what merits?
      Second off all: small problems, like the technical unreliability of the first ships that can’t go out to see more then 200 miles without something breaking, and get blocked in Singapore waiting for maintenance?”

      I can go on-and-on about this but just let me ask you if you have heard about a recent serious problem? And the merits are exactly as advertised… it is able to deploy its off board vehicles which are its main weapons and is easily upgradable which the Perrys and that Bora ship are not.

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      1. “Andrei, China is not going to be a sea power in ten years… today they are paying the Brazilians to teach them how to handle aircraft carriers… right. The Brazilians are teaching the Chinese. Takes time to build, learn, build again and in the meantime all it takes is one financial crisis and you will stop arming yourself and your military will fall back to human wave attacks and incredible losses. At all moments China’s modern economy is on a knife edge teetering between success and utter failure.”

        I doubt this highly.

        They’re going to use Brazilian-taught Chinese trainers, to teach Chinese trainers, to teach Chinese sailors.

        Unless, they’re stupid and incapable, which they’ve proven NOT to be.

        The very effect, human wave attacks, is unlikely. Incredible losses cause feverish discontent. You’re right about one thing, much of the Chinese internal politics is hidden but more flimsy than expected.

        As for overall growth that will come from Democratic integration, for the minority groups, and a more right-wing approach to economics.

        Besides the Democratic, they’ve shown great promise.

        They’re not even yet a huge IT or creativity-service sector generator. But you can bet your ass they will be.

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      2. “They’re not even yet a huge IT or creativity-service sector generator. But you can bet your ass they will be.” – we will see.

        They make second rate copies of everything, are reliant on massive exports and ultra cheap labor, do not have a real middle class, are a net importer of natural resources, have rampant pollution, multiple hostile ethnic or cultural minorities with in their borders, and a self serving elite that make capitalist robber barons look like pussies.

        But if I overlook these small problems they are in great shape!

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      3. @HGR
        “They make second rate copies of everything, are reliant on massive exports and ultra cheap labor, do not have a real middle class, are a net importer of natural resources, have rampant pollution, multiple hostile ethnic or cultural minorities with in their borders, and a self serving elite that make capitalist robber barons look like pussies. ”

        You do realize that things will not necessarily stay this way forever?

        Japan and all 4 of the Asian Tigers were once poor, making relatively low quality goods. Today that’s changed – in some ways, Japan for example has a higher standard of living than the US.

        @SomeWierdo
        “Unless, they’re stupid and incapable, which they’ve proven NOT to be.

        The very effect, human wave attacks, is unlikely. Incredible losses cause feverish discontent. You’re right about one thing, much of the Chinese internal politics is hidden but more flimsy than expected.”

        The leadership seems pretty competent right now. They’ve certainly managed their growth relatively well all things considered. Not perfectly, but relatively well.

        But yeah China is beyond human wave attacks – the PLA seems to be modernizing at a constant pace.

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      4. “The leadership seems pretty competent right now. They’ve certainly managed their growth relatively well all things considered.”

        I do not think that China’s growth has been competently managed. Not by modern standards. They are stuck in the 1800’s mentality but with the capacity to pollute with the tools of the 2000’s. Don’t you remember from European history how in the 1800’s the peasants became unemployed as farms changed and became more efficient and commercial… pouring them in mass into the cities to be exploited in squalor and misery by unscrupulous capitalist?

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  11. This ship is in trouble.

    http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2014/April/Pages/LittoralCombatShipFacesUncertainFuture.aspx

    “On Feb. 24, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel confirmed rumors that had been swirling around the littoral combat ship program for months — instead of going forward with its planned 52 ship buy, purchases would be limited to 32. ”

    But also unfortunately:

    “Slade said the Navy most likely will procure larger, better-armed versions of the LCS — a move that would increase the price of the ships and would be even more profitable for Lockheed Martin or Austal.”

    They are currently looking at alternatives:

    http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/03/18/navy-memo-details-new-lcs-replacement-task-force/

    Defense death spiral, anyone?

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    1. Chris, I appreciate the articles. I really do. The quotes that stand out to me are the following,

      “LCS is actually already more survivable than the three ship classes that it replaces.”

      “Arleigh Burkes can do it all, and they’re proven. They can kill other ships. They can find and kill subs. They can find and kill aircraft and missiles with the Aegis ballistic missile system and then attack ground targets. It’s got a wide variety of weapons,” he said. “The littoral combat ship, in my opinion, just can’t compare.”

      What you are seeing here is a tug-of-war between the old captains who will not invest any money in fighting mines or littoral-submarines and would like to hog all the money for these large blue-water ships. This will result in a smaller Navy and paradoxically a less capable Navy.

      Consider that when the LCS operates alone or in pairs it will do so in environments where there are no significant surface Naval threats other than mines and smaller patrol boats.

      The only thing that is really lacking is a measure of area air defense. It does not have to be an Argis system since its rivals in those locations will not be able to mount the sort of air raid that requires such sophistication. The Israelis have some systems developed with USA input and money that could fit nicely for that role.

      it is not indispensable but it would be nice to have a bow sonar.

      I do not know how much the above will add in size, tonnage and money but it will make the LCS a very capable ship.

      A surface-to-surface missile with a range of something like 25 miles was always planned. The preference was for an optically guided missile that the Army was developing that came to nothing. But bring it back or something similar and that will fit nicely into the ships capabilities.

      The Burke’s are deadly ships but they are like sledge hammers. Too big, too expensive and too few. Also, possibly undersized and underpowered for the weapons that are coming down the pipeline. They are conveniently already designed and carry a predictable price but we might be buying ships that are also quickly becoming obsolete.

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      1. “Arleigh Burkes can do it all, and they’re proven. They can kill other ships. They can find and kill subs. They can find and kill aircraft and missiles with the Aegis ballistic missile system and then attack ground targets. It’s got a wide variety of weapons,” he said. “The littoral combat ship, in my opinion, just can’t compare.”

        That is coming from Joe North, the program manager at Lockheed Martin. While I wouldn’t discount what he says entirely, it does raise my skepticism.

        The equal would be like going to car dealership and talking with a car salesman. What are they going to say about their cars? While I cannot discount what they say, I do believe that its fair to say they have an inherent conflict of interest.

        “The Burke’s are deadly ships but they are like sledge hammers. Too big, too expensive and too few. Also, possibly undersized and underpowered for the weapons that are coming down the pipeline. They are conveniently already designed and carry a predictable price but we might be buying ships that are also quickly becoming obsolete.”

        I agree that the Burke’s need a smaller, more agile counterpart. That’s not the issue at hand here. The issue is whether the LCS is the right ship.

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  12. And this comes directly from one of your links…

    “If China is going to deny access to the South China Sea, then the United States can demonstrate to the nation that it can deny access to the same waters. “And submarines are an impressive way to do that,” Hughes said. Aircraft carriers are too valuable to lose, he said. “We can’t send a carrier in and have it put out of action, or a $2 billion destroyer,” he said.”

    here is the link… to put a ship at risk it needs to be one that will not cripple you if you loose it. The LCS is less expensive but look out for even less expensive area denial types like those that Taiwan has been using for years as well as other Euro nations. Small, sacrificial and deadly.

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      1. Considering that for $450 million (the going cost of the LCS), an AIP submarine (maybe even two) could be built, it’s a better buy for the money.

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    1. The numbers don’t work out … and there’s one more issue. The fiscal environment going forward. The US economy remains weak, for all talk of recovery and there’s going to be a downward pressure on defense budgets.

      What it means is that getting more for the money is going to be ever more critical.

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      1. Chris, you mean this?

        http://www.informationdissemination.net/2014/02/fact-check-john-mccain-vs-bob-work.html

        I have heard all the comparisons to foreign ships before. One thing we learned from the Perry’s is that the helicopter is the ship’s most powerful surface weapon and that two helicopters are better than one. And a drone helio thrown in for additional airborne warning is better than none. Among the foreign ships is hard to find one that is armed thus… because they fleet operators. Here we are looking at a ship that is very different and can do far more.

        One thing about this article is that I did not realize that the performance of the Independence was so far better than that of the Freedom. I need to look for more data on that.

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      2. Well considering it costs so much more than the Freedom, it’d better offer something for the money.

        As I said though, I don’t think that these are a good value for the money. They both don’t offer enough relative to the amount of money they cost and relative to their displacement.

        I think that small ships are needed, but that these are a bad value.

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      3. Chris, did you read the article? the mine warfare module is very expensive. If you switch to a patrol ship the price could drop into the $300 millions which none of these foreign are.

        We are not making good comparisons when it comes to foreign ships. They where talking about the Alvaro Bazan ship… that is a mini-Burke and it costs over a billion dollars and cannot deal with mines or carry more than one helicopter. It is an excellent ship but not for the same purpose and far more expensive. Alvaro Bazan also has an Aegis radar which is a major cost escalator.

        The Freedom sea skimming hull might not be able to house a bow sonar with out loosing the ability to skim but the Independence could and adding a light weight air defense system could turn it into a very decent craft.

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      1. Probably.

        The Zumwalt costed like $3.5 billion per ship.

        I am not sure why radar stealth has suddenly become so big for ships. Perhaps radar guided missiles, but a ship cannot maneuver the way a fighter can.

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      2. To quote: “Money, dear boy.”. Main danger for ships always were and will remain submarines. In that respect, radar stealth on ships is useless. As for radar guided missiles, these can be decoyed or evaded – yes, even a ship can evade a missile (especially small, agile ships like missile or torpedo boats… destroyers, not so much). Aircraft similarly can use laser-guided or optical/IR bombs and missiles, which are all far more dangerous than radar-guided counterparts but against which radar stealth is useless.

        Problem is that US military planners nowadays are unimaginative and fossilized… they do not seem to even realize that the enemy might choose to counter them assymetrically. M1 Abrams is built exclusively for tank-to-tank combat, F-22 is built under assumption that the enemy will use radar for BVR combat (as opposed to IRST) and will attempt to gain air superiority through air-to-air combat as opposed to bombing air fields, carriers have air groups that are useful only for establishing air superiority and attacking ships but nothing else, submarines are designed to fight other submarines while ignoring importance of supply lines… and in that they forget the historical usage of weapons, which typically follows rock-paper-scissor game – US basically uses paper to counter enemy’s paper instead of using scissors.

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      3. As it turns out, the real cost may be $3.8 billion (some problems were found and a bit due to inflation too). That may be as high as $7 billion with R&D costs since so few are being built. This of course all assumes that there are no further problems with this class.

        In the case of the Zumwalt, it is simply too large to do much evading. A smaller fast attack craft maybe could. But the Zumwalt displaces close to 15,000 tons and is a heavy cruiser, more or less. I’d imagine the sonar signature on that ship would be quite large. I have noticed though that a lot of ships in many navies are going for that “stealthy clean” look.

        I’d guess that the LCS would be small enough to do some evading – it better be considering they traded everything off for a bit more speed.

        I’d have to agree that asymmetric is the problem:

        Diesel submarine vs surface ship neglected
        Diesel submarine vs nuclear submarine neglected
        F-14 which was fleet defense was a bomber interceptor; now F-18 is a somewhat deficient air superiority aircraft too
        No real ground support from carriers save for tactical bombers
        Neglecting ASW on surface fleet
        Minimal effort to counter naval mnes
        Air defense in some of the newer ships is actually quite poor and there are suspected to be gaps in the Aegis system
        Emphasis on large heavy cruisers
        Over-reliance on helicopter for certain duties (very poor flight to maintenance ratios)
        Apparently coastal patrol has been somewhat neglected

        We could make a bigger list. But that is the issue – on very linear thinking. Admittedly the US is unlikely to get itself involved in a nation state war, mostly so called “War on Terror” type conflicts, but it’s still a serious gap.

        There has also be a total orientation towards super expensive high-tech solutions.

        It’s a very 2nd generation war mentality.

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      4. “I have noticed though that a lot of ships in many navies are going for that “stealthy clean” look. ”

        Some RCS reduction can be useful (many shipboard weapons depend on radar guidance so it might not be possible for ships to turn off radar despite all dangers such as anti-radiation missiles etc), but as always there is a limit on how much you can incorporate before it becomes a liability instead.

        “I’d guess that the LCS would be small enough to do some evading – it better be considering they traded everything off for a bit more speed. ”

        Agreed.

        “I’d have to agree that asymmetric is the problem:”

        To add:
        – AEGIS is insufficiently tested and incapable of reliably identifying targets
        – brown water navy has been seriously neglected

        “Admittedly the US is unlikely to get itself involved in a nation state war, mostly so called “War on Terror” type conflicts, but it’s still a serious gap. ”

        And its current force structure is completely useless for the COIN operations.

        “It’s a very 2nd generation war mentality.”

        Indeed. And it creates problem, for US as well as its allies:
        http://slightlyeastofnew.com/2014/07/01/islamic-fundamentalism/
        I see you’ve made some nice comments there, too.

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    1. Chris, this article is really nothing. When it comes to Navy matters the press is full of paid dis-informers. What alternatives does the Navy has that have with the same draft as well as speed to operate in the littorals where every ship will be fast?

      And do not forget that they where always conceived to be cavernous so they could be adaptable to different modules and up-grades. That feature has already paid off with new systems being incorporated already. And self deployable.

      The LCS could have been larger. Could have been smaller. Could have been more expensive or less expensive. It is possible that to quiet the critics it will be enlarged and have missiles added to the hull. And maybe not.

      So let us wait and see.

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      1. Uh, this is a death spiral in motion. 40% of the ships have been cut from the procurement process.

        The modules may end up costing more, depending on whether there are problems found after deployment (and I expect there to be).

        The LCS, for a ship of its capabilities could definitely have been a lot smaller and cheaper. But as it stands, it is under-armed for its size – mostly sacrificed for speed, but a few other capabilities. There were definitely alternatives. Buying another nation’s design and license producing it would have been an alternative.

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      2. Chris, no one has a design like these LCS. Not yet. These ships have module bays that are oversized for their tonnage and they are what gives it the flexibility that the Navy was seeking. They have already gone through one up-grade in the mine warfare modules with out any problems.

        And if they do not have the missile they want in it yet that has to do with the Army’s failure to deliver one that they where planning to share with the Navy. They do not want a Harpoon size missile. They are looking for shorter range and smaller… for the targets they anticipate.

        And the reduction in 40% that you cite… or better said, the delay and some re-thinking. A lot of it is being originated by the Navy not replacing on a one-for-one basis the amphibs that are due for retirement… this is in response to the Marines not having a vehicle that can connect them to shore from a safe or at least semi-safe distance.

        Things are not that bad in the Navy. If you want to see bad look at the Marines.

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      3. Is it some rethinking though? Because the very definition of a death spiral is one where despite an increasingly defense budget, the unit cost of the equipment in question rise at a faster rate than the budget, resulting in cutbacks to the numbers produced.

        Then the various cutbacks worsen the problem because the unit costs in turn worsen as fewer are produced, worsening the cycle.

        Another question – why might anyone not want something like the LCS? I would argue (and I think Picard would too) that it’s an expensive design that does not offer capabilities commensurate with the price.

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      4. “Things are not that bad in the Navy. If you want to see bad look at the Marines.”

        All of the armed forces are in an abysmal state, despite the enormous funding the DOD receives. The F35 alone is destroying the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force and is destroying the aforementioned of other armed forces and essential NATO allies too.

        The LCS is another nail in the coffin.

        note: any branch that has more admirals than ships IS IN BAD SHAPE!

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  13. There is one other very serious issue that has been left unaddressed.

    With the older generation of destroyers being retired, this means that this will, like the F-35, play a proportionately large role in the USN’s total fleet.

    Essentially the USN’s combat fleet consists of:
    1. The nuclear submarines
    2. The nuclear carriers (mostly carrying F-18s and F-35s), along with the amphibious ships (choppers, the V-22, and the VTOL F-35)
    3. The cruisers (mostly the Tico series, and a handful of the Zumwalt)
    4. This LCS ship

    Does anyone else see here a huge gap in capability?

    No fast attack craft
    No diesel submarines
    Questionable choices for aircraft on carriers
    No specialized smaller ships
    Heavy reliance on V-22 for amphibious assault (the Marines do have their landing craft, but I recall they went wildly overbudget)

    Compounding this:

    Heavy reliance on the F-35, which if it does fail, would leave huge gaps in the air capabilities
    Very limited emphasis on anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare
    If the modules on the LCS fail, then that expands the 2 gaps above substantially
    Only small numbers of very expensive ships
    If the V-22 fails, then a huge gap is left in amphibious landing

    This leaves a few points of failure that if they don’t work, would leave huge gaps.

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    1. Indeed, US military procurement decisions were always focused on looking at capabilities of individual weapons (and even then “capability” was typically incorrectly defined) as opposed to capability of the system as a whole. I’ve noticed that people in general tend to have this “missed forrest for the trees” approach, probably because it is easier to pull numbers they typically don’t understand than to understand how weapons work in a war, as parts of the system.

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      1. There seems to be a focus on just 1 weapons system. A similar example is the M1 Abrams.

        I think in the past, we discussed it’s extensive fuel consumption. On paper, it’s a very powerful tank. In practice, it’s not the tank that’s the vulnerable point. It’s the massive logistical tail.

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    2. “– Very limited emphasis on anti-submarine and anti-mine warfare” – This is one area that is receiving a lot of attention. You might say that you disagree with what they are doing but not about the fact that they are doing something.

      The USA multi-role surface combatants are the Burkes and Ticos but the Burkes are the preponderance. Very capable vessels but like the carriers they need to operate in open waters. Together they are about 60 to 70 vessels. Then you have the Carriers, Amphibs and nuclear subs. All of them Blue Water vessels and collectively collectively are the USA front line warships.

      Not one of them is really a good choice to do anti-mines, anti-conventional-subs, defend against swarm defense, littoral patrols, anti-piracy, boarding and searches away from our chores, etc. Until the LCS came along we did those things with a collection of vessels such as the Cyclones, some catamaran transports that had a crane and the Amphibs which while slow and large had a huge wet well from where to operate and believe it or not some chartered merchant men adapted for this purpose. The LCS and an off shore floating bases (Mumfords) are replacing many of those vessels. You might not like that solution but that is what they are doing and so far so good.

      I think criticism need to focus on real flaws. Opinions and alternative solutions need to be stated as such and not as criticism which is what the paid charlatans do when promoting an alternative solution.

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      1. The thing is, the LCS so far is proving to be able to do none of the above.

        Opposition to the LCS is by no means unified. Some are promoting foreign license built alternatives. Others want a new craft designed from ground up. Still others want more heavy cruisers. Then there’s the submariners who want money for submarines.

        Heck for the price of 1 LCS, you could buy a diesel submarine. And a diesel submarine would be a lot more effective than the LCS at destroying enemy ships. Granted, it cannot do anti-mine, anti-piracy, but that’s what light fast attack craft should be for.

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  14. Throw in another problem on top of what I said.

    Those 4 ship categories are all very expensive.

    Nuclear carriers are of course very costly and you cannot have many, nor can you have many sorties of F-35s (and likely V-22s)
    Nuclear submarines cost several times that of diesels
    The cruisers are all very expensive and the Zumwalt is a couple of billion dollars
    LCS is at least $500 million and might go up even more

    So you cannot have very many ships. And when you take casualties, you lose a larger proportion of the fleet.

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  15. There are several unique problems right now with the rail gun:

    The technical problems associated with getting it operational.

    This involves something that can withstand the barrel wear, discharge the needed energy, and a few other serious technical problems that will need a lot of R&D.

    Firing the gun accurately.

    Given the muzzle velocity, that becomes a problem. Guided projectiles might be problematic in this regard. The velocities may simply be too fast for much correction, so an unguided projectile might be the only practical way to do it.

    For naval combat, maneuverable ships become a problem. It also demands another question – is this the best value for the money? Against this, let’s consider the opportunity costs of building a rail gun ship. For ship to ship combat and building dedicated ships for naval supremacy, how many conventional missile ships or diesel submarines could be built for the money?

    Shore bombardment is another issue. Hitting targets accurately has been a long problem for artillery and bombing. If it cannot work out, then the weapon will not be effective. Also, the world’s tolerance for civilian casualties is much lower than before.

    Also remember that targets are often moving not stationary. This weapon is also going to be of limited use against smaller fast attack craft for that reason.

    Unit costs.

    I alluded to this earlier, but I imagine that such a weapon would have an immense unit cost. Unless this goes down to something reasonable, it may not work out.

    The other problem is maintenance costs. A gun like this has to have good uptime and be relatively cheap to maintain. If it’s overly difficult to keep the gun operational, most of the time, it will be in a shipyard doing maintenance work or at sea with the gun not ready.

    If the gun has high maintenance downtime, then the number that can be deployed is going to be low.

    Platform.

    If only the largest cruisers can carry it, due to technical limitations, that drives costs up and limits the number that you can build.

    Some other thoughts:

    Number one, although potentially solvable has huge problems that need to be discussed before the others can even be discussed.

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    1. Chris, the problems have an order of importance and right now the distortions of the rail due to the velocity of the projectile are the number one technical problem. That is where the biggest developmental risk exist.

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      1. Perhaps so.

        But the issue is that unless they can solve all of them, what they’re going to end up with is like a gun-equivalent to the German V2 rocket. Extremely expensive, and militarily ineffective.

        Now granted, the V2 did lead to developments elsewhere, but research in the civilian world would have been a far more productive way. Similar thoughts about how strategic bombers in WWII led to major changes in civil airlines.

        The other issue is that nobody has a real solution at the moment for barrel wear, which must be solved for this to reach the kinds of velocities advertised or barrel changes will be unacceptably high.

        The problem I see here is that rail guns are being touted as this sort of “Wunderwaffe” that can solve everything, when it may not be the case. Plus like Wunderwaffe, they are immensely expensive to develop and the opportunity costs are quite high.

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  16. The funny and sad part about this is that the end speed may only be 38 knots in the DOT&E 2016 annual report.

    “LCS 4 failed its sprint speed requirement of 40 knots, demonstrating a maximum sustained speed of only 37.9 knots in calm waters.”

    The Capitani Romani-class cruiser that was built in the 1940s for the Italian Navy could outrun that.

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  17. Even more funny:
    https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-06/pentagon-blocks-littoral-combat-ship-overrun-from-a-gao-report

    In a report examining Navy shipbuilding contracts, the U.S. Government Accountability Office deleted overrun information on two of the Littoral Combat Ships launched in late 2014 — the USS Milwaukee built by Lockheed Martin Corp. and the USS Jackson built by Austal Ltd. — at the request of the Defense Office of Prepublication and Security Review.

    The GAO said the Defense Department “deemed the cost growth” on both vessels “to be sensitive but unclassified information, which is excluded from this public report. However, the percent difference” in cost for each ship “was above target cost.” Other types of ships were listed with specific data on cost increases that ranged from 4 percent to 45 percent.

    The Pentagon office “should have been able to disclose the magnitude of the cost growth even if some of the underlying details were competition sensitive,” said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy.

    “The department failed to consider the public interest in knowing that cost targets were being exceeded, and by how much,” he said. “Instead, it looks like DoD is trying to keep unfavorable facts out of the public eye. In the long-run, that’s not a smart move.”

    Yeah there’s something bad going on with the costs and we don’t even know how much they are overbudget by.

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