NATO air forces proposal revised

Current state

As of fall of 2013, NATO member states were Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Air forces were as follows:

Albania:

no fixed-wing aircraft or attack helicopters

Belgium: 2,32 billion USD

49 F-16A, 10 F-16B (multirole) – 1,77 billion USD

2 Dassault Falcon 20 (transport) – 7 million USD

2 Embraer ERJ-135 (transport) – 33 million USD

2 Embraer ERJ-145 (transport) – 42 million USD

11 Lockheed C-130H (transport) – 472 million USD

Bulgaria: 878 million USD

5 MiG-21bis, 1 MiG-21UM (multirole) – 90 million USD

12 MiG-29S, 3 MiG-29UB (multirole) – 480 million USD

10 Su-25K, 4 Su-25UB (close air support) – 308 million USD

Canada:

72 F-18A, 31 F-18B (multirole) – 3,5 billion USD

3 A-310 (transport) – 240 million USD

2 A-310 (tanker) – 160 million USD

4 C-17 (transport) – 992 million USD

15 C-130 (transport) – 274,5 million USD

17 C-130J (transport) – 1,15 billion USD

Croatia:

6 MiG-21bisD, 4 MiG-21UMD (multirole) – 150 million USD

2 An-32B (transport) – 18 million USD

14 Mi-8 (transport) – 45 million USD

10 Mi-171Sh (multirole) – 130 million USD

Czech Republic:

12 JAS-39C, 2 JAS-39D (multirole) – 462 million USD

19 L-159A (attack) – 173 million USD

4 C-295M (transport) – 122 million USD

10 L-410 (transport) – 8 million USD

Denmark:

24 F-16A, 6 F-16B (multirole) – 900 million USD

4 C-130J (transport) – 271 million USD

Estonia:

2 L-39 (attack) – 11 million USD

2 An-2 (transport) – 18 million USD

France:

44 Rafale C, 34 Rafale B (multirole) – 5,85 billion USD

44 Mirage 2000 5F/C (multirole) – 2,23 billion USD

63 Mirage 2000 D (attack) – 3,19 billion USD

14 KC-135 (tanker) – 784 million USD

27 CN-235 (transport) – 581 million USD

14 C-130H (transport) – 600 million USD

38 C-160F (transport) – not found

1 A-400M (transport) – 122 million USD

38 Rafale M (multirole) – 3,15 billion USD

25 Super Entendard (attack) – 785 million USD

Germany:

103 Typhoon (multirole) – 12,36 billion USD

82 Tornado IDS (multirole), 31 Tornado ECR (EW) – 5,64 billion USD

71 C-160D (transport)

1 A-310-304 (transport) – 70 million USD

4 A-310-304 MRTT (tanker) – 280 million USD

Greece:

116 F-16C, 41 F-16D (multirole) – 10,99 billion USD

17 Mirage 2000EGM, 2 Mirage 2000BGM, 25 Mirage 2000-5 Mk2 (multirole) – 2,23 billion USD

34 F-4E (multirole) – 601,8 million USD

10 C-130H, 3 C-130B (transport) – 461,28 million USD

8 C-27J (transport) – 288,56 million USD

Hungary:

12 JAS-39C, 2 JAS-39D (multirole) – 462 million USD

3 C-17A (transport) – 744 million USD

5 An-26 (transport) – 20 million USD

Iceland:

N/A

Italy:

75 EF-2000 (multirole) – 9 billion USD

42 AMX ACOL A-11A (attack)

60 Tornado IDS (multirole) – 2,88 billion USD

15 Tornado ECR (SEAD) – 825 million USD

12 C-27J (transport) – 433 million USD

4 KC-767A (tanker)

5 C-130J (transport) – 271 million USD

6 KC-130J (tanker) – 424 million USD

10 C-130J-30 (transport) – 677 million USD

Latvia:

2 An-2 (transport) – 18 million USD

1 L-410UVP (transport) – 800.000 USD

Lithuania:

2 L-39ZA (attack) – 11 million USD

3 C-27J (transport) – 108,2 million USD

2 L-410 (transport) – 1,6 million USD

3 An-2 (transport) – 18 million USD

Luxembourg:

N/A

Netherlands:

68 F-16A/B (multirole) – 2,04 billion USD

2 F-35A (attack) – 368 million USD

4 C-130H-4 (transport) – 172 million USD

2 KDC-10 (tanker), 1 DC-10 (transport) – 378 million USD

3 C-17 (transport) – 744 million USD

Norway:

47 F-16A, 10 F-16B (multirole) – 1,71 billion USD

4 C-130J-30 (transport) – 271 million USD

Poland:

36 F-16C, 12 F-16D (multirole) – 3,36 billion USD

26 MiG-29A, 6 MiG-29UB (mutirole) – 722 million USD

26 Su-22M4, 6 Su-22UM3K (attack) – 640 million USD

2 An-28TD (transport) – 11 million USD

10 M28B TD, 11 M28B/PT (transport) – 63 million USD

14 C-295M (transport) – 426 million USD

5 C-130E (transport) – 85 million USD

Portugal:

35 F-16A, F-16B (multirole) – 1,05 billion USD

15 Alpha Jet A (attack) – 420 million USD

3 C-130H (transport) – 129 million USD

3 C-130H-30 (transport) – 129 million USD

7 C-295M (transport) – 213 million USD

Romania:

36 MiG-21 Lancer (multirole) – 540 million USD

6 C-27J (transport) – 216 million USD

5 C-130H (transport) – 215 million USD

Slovakia:

8 MiG-29AS (multirole) – 176 million USD

3 L-39ZAM (attack) – 16,5 million USD

1 An-26 (transport) – 4 million USD

7 L-410 (transport) – 5,6 million USD

Slovenia:

11 PC-9M (attack) – 68,2 million USD

2 PC-6 (transport) – 4 million USD

1 L-410 (transport) – 0,8 million USD

Spain:

50 Eurofighter Typhoon (multirole) – 6 billion USD

86 F/A-18A/B (multirole) – 2,92 billion USD

2 KC-707 (tanker) – 120 million USD

1 C-707 (transport) – 40 million USD

12 C-212 (transport) – 108 million USD

10 CN-235 100M (transport) – 215 million USD

13 C-295 (transport) – 395 million USD

5 KC-130H (tanker) –

7 C-130H (transport) – 300 million USD

Turkey:

179 F-16C, 48 F-16D (multirole) – 12,53 billion USD

152 F-4E (multirole) – 2,69 billion USD

7 KC-135R (tanker) – 392 million USD

43 CN235-100M (transport) – 925 million USD

15 C-130 (transport) – 275 million USD

17 C-160T (transport)

United Kingdom:

85 Eurofighter Typhoon (multirole) – 11,73 billion USD

3 F-35B (attack) – 876 million USD

112 Tornado GR4 (attack) – 6,72 billion USD

8 TriStar (tanker)

6 Voyager (tanker)

8 C-130K (transport) –

24 C-130J (transport) – 1,62 billion USD

8 Globemaster III (transport) –

United States:

USAF:

343 A-10C (attack) – 5,49 billion USD

8 AC-130H, 17 AC-130U, 12 AC-130W (attack) – 2,96 billion USD

66 B-1B (bomber) – 26,6 billion USD

20 B-2A (bomber) – 22,8 billion USD

76 B-52H (bomber) – 5,78 billion USD

29 C-5A, 34 C-5B, 2 C-5C, 12 C-5M (transport) – 19,64 billion USD

16 C-12C, 6 C-12D, 2 C-12F, 4 C-12J (transport) – 168 million USD

223 C-17A (cargo) – 55,3 billion USD

11 C-26 (cargo)

13 C-27J (cargo) – 469 million USD

13 C-130E, 265 C-130H (cargo) – 11,59 billion USD

10 C-130J, 79 C-130J-30 (cargo) – 6,03 billion USD

2 C-144 CN-235-100M (transport) – 82 million USD

8 C-145 M-28B (transport) – 44 million USD

5 C-146A (transport)

222 F-15C, 32 F-15D (air superiority) – 32 billion USD

219 F-15E (strike) – 9,6 billion USD

840 F-16C, 163 F-16D (multirole) – 70,2 billion USD

180 F-22A (air superiority) – 49,14 billion USD

25 F-35A (attack) – 4,6 billion USD

59 KC-10A (tanker) – 7,43 billion USD

363 KC-135R, 54 KC-135T (tanker) – 23,35 billion USD

10 LC-130H (cargo) – 429 million USD

US Army:

17 C-12C, 14 C-12D, 17 C-12F (cargo/transport) – 288 million USD

4 C-20C (cargo/transport) – 66 million USD

43 C-23 (cargo/transport) – 295 million USD

11 C-26E (cargo/transport)

2 C-31A (cargo/transport)

2 C-37A, 1 C-37B (cargo/transport) – 79 million USD

669 AH-64 (attack) – 22,08 billion USD

USMC:

2 C-9B (cargo/transport)

48 F-18A, 86 F-18C, 95 F-18D (multirole) – 13,94 billion

5 KC-130F, 2 KC-130R, 28 KC-130T, 46 KC-130J (transport) – 5,5 billion (est.)

99 AV-8B (strike) – 4,46 billion USD

21 F-35B (strike) – 6,13 billion USD

USN:

34 C-2A (cargo/transport, carrier-capable) – 1,39 billion USD

15 C-9B (cargo/transport) – 573 million USD

1 C-20A, 2 C-20D, 5 C-20G (cargo/transport) – 131 million USD

1 C-37A, 3 C-37B (cargo/transport) – 106 million USD

11 C-40A (cargo/transport) – 770 million USD

19 C-130T (cargo/transport) – 1,29 billion USD

1 CT-39G (cargo/transport)

170 EA-6B (electronic warfare) – 8,84 billion USD

96 EA-18G (electronic warfare) – 6,53 billion USD

74 F-18A, 26 F-18B, 286 F-18C, 47 F-18D (multirole) – 26,04 billion USD

488 F-18E/F (strike) – 33,18 billion USD

4 F-35C (strike) – 944 million USD

Total number of aircraft:

Air superiority/multirole: 3.890 aircraft, 4.821 sortie per day

F-16A/B: 219 (263 sorties per day)

F-16C/D: 1.435 (1.722 sorties per day)

MiG-21: 104 (208 sorties per day)

MiG-29: 55 (110 sorties per day)

JAS-39C/D: 56 (112 sorties per day)

F-18A/B: 306 (367 sorties per day)

F-18C/D: 514 (617 sorties per day)

Mirage 2000: 88 (44 5F/C, 17 EGM, 2 BGM, 25 -5 Mk2) (176 sorties per day)

Rafale: 38 (76 sorties per day)

Typhoon: 313 (626 sorties per day)

Tornado: 142 (128 sorties per day)

F-4E: 186 (72 sorties per day)

F-15C/D: 254 (254 sorties per day)

F-22A: 180 (90 sorties per day)

Ground attack: 1.488 aircraft, ~2.300 sorties per day

F-18E/F: 488 (586 sorties per day)

Mirage 2000D: 63 (126 sorties per day)

Super Etendard: 25

Tornado: 112 (101 sortie per day)

AMX ACOL A-11A: 42

L-39ZA: 5

F-35A: 27 (9 sorties per day)

F-35B: 24 (8 sorties per day)

F-35C: 4 (1,3 sorties per day)

A-10C: 343 (1.029 sorties per day)

AC-130: 37

F-15E: 219 (219 sorties per day)
AV-8B: 99 (99 sorties per day)

(NOTE: all aircraft mentioned except A-10 and possibly L-39 and AMX are incapable of carrying out quality CAS).

SEAD/DEAD/EW: 312, ~350 sorties per day

Tornado ECR: 46 (41 sortie per day)

EA-6B: 170

EA-18G: 96 (115 sorties per day)

Strategic bombing: 162 aircraft, ~75 sorties per day

B1B: 66

B-2A: 20 (4 sorties per day)

B-52H: 76

Cargo/transport: 1167 aircraft

Aerial refuelling: 534 aircraft

TOTAL: 7.383 aircraft (5.682 combat, 1.701 support)

Aircraft unit flyaway costs in FY-2013 USD:

A-10: 16 million

AC-130: 80 million

AH-64: 33 million

Alpha Jet A: 28 million attack (?), 15 million trainer

AV-8B: 45 million

AV-8B Plus: 50 million

B-1: 403 million

B-2: 1,14 billion

B-52: 76 million

EA-6B: 52 million

EF-2000 T2: 138 million UK, 120 million German (and pres. other variants)

F-4E: 17,7 million

F-15A: 43 million

F-15C: 126 million

F-15E: 44 million

F-16A: 30 million

F-16C: 70 million

F-18A: 34 million

F-18C: 68 million

F-18E: 68 million

F-18G: 68 million

F-22A: 273 million

F-35A: 184 million

F-35B: 292 million

F-35C: 236 million

Gripen A: 30 million

Gripen C: 33 million

Gripen E: 86 million

Harrier II: 50 million

L-39: 5,5 million

L-159A: 9,1 million

L-159B: 24 million

MiG-21-93: 29 million

MiG-21bis: 15 million (?)

MiG-29A: 22 million

MiG-29B: 25 million

MiG-29S: 32 million (?)

MiG-29SMT: 45 million

MiG-29M: 50 million

MiG-29K: 55 million

MiG-35: 60 million

Mirage 2000: 50,7 million

Mirage 2000-9: 71 million

PC-9M: 6,2 million

Rafale C: 75 million

Rafale M: 83 million

Su-17/20/22: 20 million (?)

Su-25: 22 million

Su-30MK: 70 million

Su-33: 70 million

Su-34: 65 million

Su-35: 75 million

Super Entendard: 31,4 million

Tornado ECR: 55 million

Tornado IDS: 48 million

Viggen: 45 million

A-400M: 122 million

An-2: 9 million

An-26: 4 million (?)

An-28: 5,5 million

A-310-304: 70 million

A-310MRTT: 80 million

AN-32: 9 million

C-2A: 40,8 million

C-5A: 217,5 million

C-5B: 254,8 million

C-9B: 38,2 million

C-12: 6 million

C-17: 248 million

C-20: 16,38 million

C-23: 6,86 million

C-27J: 36,07 million

C-37A: 26,4 million

C-40: 70 million

C-130A: 18,3 million

C-130B: 10,76 million

C-130E: 17 million

C-130H: 42,9 million

C-130J: 67,7 million

C-144: 41 million

C-145: 5,5 million

C-212: 9 million

C-295: 30,4 million

C-295M: 80 million

C-707: 40 million (?)

CN-235: 21,5 million

CN-295: 30 million

Dassault Falcon 20: 3,5 million (?)

Embraer ERJ-135: 16,5 million

Embraer ERJ-145: 21 million

KC-10: 126 million

KC-130J: 70,7 million

KC-135: 56 million

KC-707: 60 million (?)

Mi-8: 3,2 million

L-410: 800.000

M-28: 3 million

PC-6: 2 million

Funds avaliable per air force

Belgium: 2,32 billion USD

Bulgaria: 878 million USD

Canada: 6,3 billion USD

Croatia: 373 million USD (adjusts for MiGs crashed)

Czech Republic: 765 million USD

Denmark: 1,17 billion USD

Estonia: 29 million USD

France: 17,4 billion USD

  • Army: 13,46 billion USD

  • Navy: 3,94 billion USD

Germany: 18,5 billion USD (est.)

Greece: 4,86 billion USD (1/3 of current strength cost)

Hungary: 1,23 billion USD

Italy: 15 billion USD (est.)

  • Army: 12 billion USD

  • Navy: 3 billion USD

Latvia: 19 million USD

Lithuania: 139 million USD

Netherlands: 3,7 billion USD

Norway: 1,98 billion USD

Poland: 5,31 billion USD

Portugal: 1,94 billion USD

Romania: 971 million USD

Slovakia: 202 million USD

Slovenia: 73 million USD

Spain: 7,6 billion USD (75% of current strength cost)

Turkey: 16,8 billion USD

United Kingdom: 21 billion USD

  • Army: 17 billion USD

  • Navy: 4 billion USD

United States: 244 billion USD (50% of current strength cost)

  • Army: 170 billion USD

  • Navy: 50 billion USD

  • Marine Corps: 24 billion USD

Proposal

Basic outline

Aircraft used will be these:
Air superiority fighter (FLX “Hawk”) – 25 million USD, 29 million USD naval variant

Close air support fighter (ALX “Hornet”) – 9,2 million USD, 11 million USD naval variant

Forward air controller (OLX “Hawkeye”) – 2 million USD, 2,2 million USD naval variant

Heavy airlifter (C-130J) – 68 million USD

Light dirt strip airlifter (C-123) – 5,17 million USD

STOL air lifter (C-7A) – 6,7 million USD, 7 million USD naval variant (?)

Air refuelling tanker (KC-10) – 178,5 million USD

Relative numbers will be 12 air superiority fighters : 36 close air support fighters : 24 forward air controllers : 2 heavy air lifters : 6 light dirt strip air lifters : 2 STOL air lifters : 1 air refuelling tanker (batch cost: 1,04 billion USD), and 4 air superiority fighters : 8 close air support fighters : 5 forward air controllers : 1 STOL air lifter for navies (batch cost: 223,8 million USD); independent air forces will be merged into armies. USMC will have same structure as navies, and will use navalized aircraft. If funds are not avaliable for even a single batch to be procured, all numbers will be reduced to a percentage of funds that are avaliable (a reduction to 40% for example will result in 6 air superiority fighters, 16 CAS fighters, 10 forward air controllers, 2 SEAD/DEAD fighters, 4 dirt strip air lifters and no air refuelling tankers or AWACS for army). While assault helicopters will be replaced by fixed-wing aircraft, transport helicopters will, in most cases, remain.

It should be noted that CAS fighter (ALX) can act as Forward Air Controller when needed, just like OLX can perform CAS role. Both however have shortcomings when performing roles other than what they are designed for, though OLX is a better choice for both observation and CAS aircraft if opposition is insurgency as opposed to nation-state’s military force, and ALX is a better choice for both roles in nation-state conflicts.

Air forces strengths

Belgium: 2,09 billion USD

24 FLX (600 million USD)

72 ALX (662,4 million USD)

48 OLX (96 million USD)

4 C-130J (272 million USD)

14 C-123 (72,4 million USD)

4 C-7A (26,8 million USD)

2 KC-10 (357 million USD)

Bulgaria: 741 million USD

10 FLX (250 million USD)

30 ALX (276 million USD)

20 OLX (40 million USD)

2 C-130J (136 million USD)

5 C-123 (25,9 million USD)

2 C-7A (13,4 million USD)

Canada: 6,23 billion USD

72 FLX (1,8 billion USD)

216 ALX (1,99 billion USD)

144 OLX (288 million USD)

12 C-130J (816 million USD)

36 C-123 (186 million USD)

12 C-7A (80 million USD)

6 KC-10 (1,07 billion USD)

Croatia: 369 million USD

6 FLX (150 million USD)

18 ALX (166 million USD)

12 OLX (24 million USD)

3 C-123 (15,5 million USD)

2 C-7A (13,4 million USD)

Czech Republic: 760 million USD

12 FLX (300 million USD)

24 ALX (221 million USD)

24 OLX (48 million USD)

2 C-130J (136 million USD)

8 C-123 (41,4 million USD)

2 C-7A (13,4 million USD)

Denmark: 1,15 billion USD

12 FLX (300 million USD)

48 ALX (442 million USD)

24 OLX (48 million USD)

2 C-130J (136 million USD)

6 C-123 (31 million USD)

2 C-7A (13,4 million USD)

1 KC-10 (178,5 million USD)

Estonia: 28 million USD

14 OLX (28 million USD)

France: 17,4 billion USD

  • Army: 13,45 billion USD

    • 168 FLX (4,2 billion USD)

    • 468 ALX (4,31 billion USD)

    • 312 OLX (624 million USD)

    • 24 C-130J (1,63 billion USD)

    • 72 C-123 (372,2 million USD)

    • 24 C-7A (174,2 million USD)

    • 12 KC-10 (2,14 billion USD)

  • Navy: 3,94 billion USD

    • 72 FLX/N (2,12 billion USD)

    • 144 ALX/N (1,58 billion USD)

    • 72 OLX/N (158,4 million USD)

    • 12 C-7A (84 million USD)

Germany: 18,49 billion USD

228 FLX (5,7 billion USD)

636 ALX (5,85 billion USD)

420 OLX (840 million USD)

34 C-130J (2,31 billion USD)

102 C-123 (527 million USD)

34 C-7A (228 million USD)

17 KC-10 (3,03 billion USD)

Greece: 4,86 billion USD

60 FLX (1,5 billion USD)

180 ALX (1,66 billion USD)

120 OLX (240 million USD)

8 C-130J (544 million USD)

28 C-123 (145 million USD)

8 C-7A (54 million USD)

4 KC-10 (714 million USD)

Hungary: 1,23 billion USD

12 FLX (300 million USD)

36 ALX (331,2 million USD)

24 OLX (48 million USD)

2 C-130J (136 million USD)

30 C-123 (155,1 million USD)

12 C-7A (80,4 million USD)

1 KC-10 (178,5 million USD)

Italy: 15 billion USD (est.)

  • Army: 12 billion USD

    • 144 FLX (3,3 billion USD)

    • 396 ALX (3,64 billion USD)

    • 300 OLX (600 million USD)

    • 25 C-130J (1,7 billion USD)

    • 80 C-123 (413,6 million USD)

    • 30 C-7A (201 million USD)

    • 12 KC-10 (2,14 billion USD)

  • Navy: 3 billion USD (13 batches)

    • 48 FLX/N (1,41 billion USD)

    • 120 ALX/N (1,32 billion USD)

    • 84 OLX/N (184,8 million USD)

    • 12 C-7A (84 million USD)

Latvia: 17,17 million USD

6 OLX (12 million USD)

1 C-123 (5,17 million USD)

Lithuania: 139,57 million USD

12 ALX (110,4 million USD)

12 OLX (24 million USD)

1 C-123 (5,17 million USD)

Netherlands: 3,7 billion USD

48 FLX (1,2 billion USD)

120 ALX (1,1 billion USD)

72 OLX (144 million USD)

6 C-130J (408 million USD)

18 C-123 (93,06 million USD)

6 C-7A (40,2 million USD)

4 KC-10 (714 million USD)

Norway: 1,98 billion USD

24 FLX (600 million USD)

72 ALX (662,4 million USD)

48 OLX (96 million USD)

4 C-130J (272 million USD)

20 C-123 (103,4 million USD)

10 C-7A (67 million USD)

1 KC-10 (178,5 million USD)

Poland: 5,32 billion USD

72 FLX (1,8 billion USD)

180 ALX (1,66 billion USD)

120 OLX (240 million USD)

10 C-130J (680 million USD)

30 C-123 (155 million USD)

10 C-7A (67 million USD)

4 KC-10 (714 million USD)

Portugal: 1,94 billion USD

24 FLX (600 million USD)

72 ALX (662,4 million USD)

48 OLX (96 million USD)

2 C-130J (136 million USD)

12 C-123 (62,04 million USD)

4 C-7A (26,8 million USD)

2 KC-10 (357 million USD)

Romania: 970 million USD

12 FLX (300 million USD)

48 ALX (441,6 million USD)

24 OLX (48 million USD)

2 C-130J (136 million USD)

6 C-123 (31 million USD)

2 C-7A (13,4 million USD)

Slovakia: 196 million USD

12 ALX (110,4 million USD)

12 OLX (24 million USD)

12 C-123 (62,04 million USD)

Slovenia: 71 million USD

6 ALX (55,2 million USD)

3 C-123 (15,51 million USD)

Spain: 7,59 billion USD (75% of current strength cost)

96 FLX (2,4 billion USD)

252 ALX (2,32 billion USD)

180 OLX (360 million USD)

14 C-130J (952 million USD)

42 C-123 (217 million USD)

14 C-7A (93,8 million USD)

7 KC-10 (1,25 billion USD)

Turkey: 16,8 billion USD

192 FLX (4,8 billion USD)

576 ALX (5,3 billion USD)

432 OLX (864 million USD)

32 C-130J (2,18 billion USD)

112 C-123 (579 million USD)

32 C-7A (214 million USD)

16 KC-10 (2,86 billion USD)

United Kingdom: 21 billion USD

  • Army: 17 billion USD

    • 204 FLX (5,1 billion USD)

    • 576 ALX (5,3 billion USD)

    • 384 OLX (768 million USD)

    • 32 C-130J (2,18 billion USD)

    • 96 C-123 (496 million USD)

    • 46 C-7A (308 million USD)

    • 16 KC-10 (2,86 billion USD)

  • Navy: 3,98 billion USD

    • 72 FLX (2,12 billion USD)

    • 136 ALX (1,5 billion USD)

    • 120 OLX (240 million USD)

    • 17 C-7A (119 million USD)

United States: 245 billion USD (50% of current strength cost)

  • Army: 170 billion USD

    • 2.200 FLX (55 billion USD)

    • 5.000 ALX (46 billion USD)

    • 4.000 OLX (8 billion USD)

    • 250 C-130J (17 billion USD)

    • 1.200 C-123 (6,2 billion USD)

    • 300 C-7A (2,01 billion USD)

    • 200 KC-10 (35,7 billion USD)

  • Navy: 50 billion USD

    • 880 FLX/N (25,92 billion USD)

    • 1.760 ALX/N (19,36 billion USD)

    • 1.440 OLX/N (3,17 billion USD)

    • 220 C-7A (1,54 billion USD)

  • Marine Corps: 25 billion USD

    • 440 FLX/N

    • 880 ALX/N

    • 720 OLX/N

    • 110 C-7A

  • Total: 19.600 aircraft

Total number of aircraft

This proposal would result in following number of aircraft and sorties for NATO:

Air superiority: 5.152 aircraft, 10.304 sorties

CAS / SEAD: 12.090 aircraft, 36.270 sorties

FAC / CAS: 9.236 aircraft, 27.708 sorties

Total combat: 26.478 aircraft, 74.282 sorties

Heavy air lift: 467 aircraft

Light air lift: 2.864 aircraft

Air refuelling: 305 aircraft

Total support: 3.636 aircraft

Total: 30.114 aircraft

Comparision with current force

This proposal gives NATO 4 times as many aircraft as it currently has, even though total cost of the force is far less. Combat aircraft used in proposal are also far superior to the types being replaced even in one on one comparision; when combined with increase in the force size (4,7 times as many combat aircraft and cca 8 times as many combat sorties), it results in major multiplication of NATOs air forces’ combat ability. Survivability is also greatly increased, as most if not all types do not require concrete air strips for operation. This also has the effect of reducing costs of maintaining air bases where aircraft are located, including a removal of the need for (ridiculous) “FOD walks”. All combat aircraft can also operate from roads; this includes not only takeoff and landing but also maintenance and repairs. Further, this proposal replaces close to a hundred different aircraft types used across the NATO – many if not most of them used by the United States – with a total of seven different aircraft types, vastly simplifying logistics. Most importantly, simpler and more rugged design of combat part of the force – resulting in lower operating costs and easier maintenance – will lead to easier training and thus improved force effectiveness even if current force is replaced on a 1-for-1 basis and design superiority of proposed aircraft is ignored.

Combat aircraft proposed have endurance and fuel requirements better than types now in use, so need for tankers will be reduced, and all types are superior in their specified missions when compared to aircraft now in service across NATO militaries.

Comparative scenarios

USAF vs USAAF

USAF:

222 F-15C

32 F-15D

219 F-15E

840 F-16C

163 F-16D

180 F-22A

25 F-35A

343 A-10C

476 tankers

USAAF:

2.200 FLX

5.000 ALX

4.000 OLX

200 tankers

343 A-10s can generate 1.029 CAS sorties per day. For comparision, 5.000 ALX + 4.000 OLX can generate 27.000 CAS sorties per day, a 26:1 advantage. While A-10 has a total of 28 attack passes, ALX has 23 attack passes and OLX has 44 attack passes; thus, A-10 fleet gives 28.812 attack passes per day, ALX fleet gives 345.000 attack passes per day and OLX fleet gives 528.000 attack passes per day. As a result, USAAFs CAS would be far more effective than USAFs in both nation-state and counter-insurgency warfare.

As far as air superiority goes, USAF can generate 473 F-15 sorties, 1.204 F-16 sorties, 60 F-22 sorties and 8 F-35 sorties per day. Only supercruiser among these aircraft is the F-22, but it has too low fuel fraction to have useful supersonic endurance.

FLX has better supersonic endurance than the F-22, and far more complete situational awareness than any of USAFs fighters. It also has lower visual, IR and electronic signatures than any of fighters listed due to small size, supercruise capability and completely passive sensor suite. This will allow it to regularly surprise all US fighters. Below, RANDs scenario will be adopted for purposes of this comparision; both forces have to shoot down each another, and neither can run else its support assets (tankers) get shot down.

Typical loadouts are as follows:

F-15: 2 WVRAAM, 6 EM BVRAAM, 8,6 gun bursts

F-16: 2 WVRAAM, 6 EM BVRAAM, 4,7 gun bursts

F-22: 2 WVRAAM, 6 EM BVRAAM, 4,8 gun bursts

F-35: 4 EM BVRAAM, 2,6 gun bursts

FLX: 4 WVRAAM, 6 IR BVRAAM, 6,1 gun bursts

Probability of kill:

3-missile EM BVR missile salvo: 0,08 + 0,0736 + 0,0677 = 22,1%

4-missile EM BVR missile salvo: 0,08 + 0,0736 + 0,0677 + 0,0623 = 28,4%

3-missile IR BVR missile salvo: 0,11 + 0,0979 + 0,0871 = 29,5%

4-missile IR BVR missile salvo: 0,11 + 0,0979 + 0,0871 + 0,0776 = 37,3%

IR WVR missile: 15%

Rotary cannon: 26%

Revolver cannon: 31%

Linear action cannon: 31%

473 F-15, 1.204 F-16, 60 F-22, 8 F-35 (USAF, total 1.745) vs 2.200 FLX (USAAF)

First shot to the USAF

1.745 USAF fighters fire 3.474 3-missile EM BVR salvos and 8 4-missile EM BVR salvos. 770 USAAF fighters shot down. 1.430 USAAF fighters fire 2.860 3-missile IR BVR salvos. 844 USAF fighters shot down. 244 F-15, 622 F-16, 31 F-22, 4 F-35 remain. 901 USAF fighters fire 897 WVR missiles. 135 USAAF fighters shot down. 1.295 USAAF fighters fire 5.180 WVR missiles. 777 USAF fighters shot down. 124 USAF fighters fire guns. 32 USAAF fighters shot down. 1.263 USAAF fighters fire guns. 124 USAF fighters shot down. USAAF fighters proceed and shoot down USAF tankers.

Aircraft losses: 937 USAAF fighters, 1.745 USAF fighters, 476 USAF tankers

Crew in lost aircraft: 937 USAAF, 4.031 USAF (2.127 fighters, 1.904 tankers)

Personnel losses: 187 USAAF, 1.948 USAF

(Assumption is that 20% of the crew in fighters and 80% of the crew in tankers do not survive, but all surviving airmen are recovered).

First shot to the USAAF

2.200 USAAF fighters fire 4.400 3-missile IR BVR salvos. 1.641 USAF fighters shot down. 104 USAF fighters remain (28 F-15, 72 F-16, 4 F-22). 104 USAF fighters fire 208 3-missile EM BVR salvos. 46 USAAF fighters shot down. 2.154 USAAF fighters fire 8.616 WVR missiles. 104 USAF fighters shot down. USAAF fighters proceed and shoot down USAF tankers.

Aircraft losses: 46 USAAF fighters, 1.745 USAF fighters, 476 USAF tankers.

Crew in lost aircraft: 46 USAAF, 4.031 USAF

Personnel losses: 9 USAAF, 1.948 USAF

Conclusion

Current pork-filled, MICC-compatible producrement system has driven Western air forces to irrelevancy, but at the ever-growing tax expense. This decay has to be reversed, and proposed plan is the best possibility.

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21 thoughts on “NATO air forces proposal revised

  1. Other interesting areas worth considering are:

    Officer to troop ratio; most armies these days have too many officers, command structure, and promotion structure (no more careerists)
    How much flight hours are these aircraft/pilots going to spend
    Coordination with ground forces (especially CAS), and combined arms (ex: with Navy too)
    Another issue is that the truth is, most armed forces today are very 2nd generation in their orientation, when they really need to be 3rd generation; that is going to need a change in thinking
    Probably nationalizing the defense industries (goes against neoliberal ideology, but when we look at the appalling cost overruns and other issues of for-profit defense companies, it’s probably necessary)
    The types of enemies (insurgency vs state warfare, which seems more likely)

    I think that the interesting thing is, when you look at it this way, the current air forces came about due to the way military leaders think, combined with the defense industry.

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    1. “- Officer to troop ratio; most armies these days have too many officers, command structure, and promotion structure (no more careerists)”

      US military is the especially big offender due to its “up or out” policy, which breeds careerism. In the Royal Navy AFAIK, officers can stay at their posts as long as they like and lack of advancement in the ranks is not seen as something negative.

      “- Probably nationalizing the defense industries (goes against neoliberal ideology, but when we look at the appalling cost overruns and other issues of for-profit defense companies, it’s probably necessary)”

      It would be ideal. My personal ideal would be:
      – private ownership of small business (family business, basically)
      – collective ownership of large business
      – state ownership of strategically important business (arms industry etc.) with possibility of privately and collectively owned firms (so there will always be a state-owned small arms factory, for example, but nothing will prevent privately-owned factory from submitting its own designs for a competition)

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      1. “It would be ideal. My personal ideal would be:
        – private ownership of small business (family business, basically)
        – collective ownership of large business
        – state ownership of strategically important business (arms industry etc.) with possibility of privately and collectively owned firms (so there will always be a state-owned small arms factory, for example, but nothing will prevent privately-owned factory from submitting its own designs for a competition)”

        That would probably be the best solution and in fact it was the solution that existed in the United States and all capitalist countries France, UK etc prior to WWII. There were private firms that built everything from, small arms, to battleships, passing through tanks and aircraft, but there were also state owned arsenals that handled small arms and tanks, and navy owned shipyards (Brooklyn Navy Yard in US for example) and the Admiralty yards in UK that handled ship building. Also for ships in the US the design was handled by the Department of the Navy through Bureau of Ships and Bureau of Weapons, that started and manged projects and only outsourced specific parts of the work to private entities.

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      2. If you think about it, that is effectively what the East Asians have. You may disagree with the 3rd point – state ownership, but in practice, in nations like Japan, the Ministry of Finance has a lot of control as does METI. So in effect, they do get to run their own independent day to day decisions, but the state heavily controls their long term directions.

        That’s how the Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese and a few others got rapid growth. That’s how China is doing it too. Note of course in China, the relatively recent re-emergence of the SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) after years of retreat.

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  2. Aircraft unit flyaway costs in FY-2013 USD
    F-35A: 184 million

    This again? I thought I corrected this misconception/misinformation.

    CURRENT FLYAWAY COST: $112.86 million

    USAF Budget Statement – https://www.bga-aeroweb.com/Defense/Budget-Data/FY2015/F-35-USAF-PROC-FY2015.pdf (See Page 3 and add up everything under Recurring Flyaway Costs for FY 2014 and divide by 19)

    FINAL FLYAWAY COST: $84.6 million (2019 dollars) or about $75 million (2014 dollars).

    GAO Report 2014 – (Assumes that no further domestic or international order cuts take place)

    This may go contradict your predictions regarding cost but figures are there for you to see. You’re not being honest with your readers by quoting a blatantly false $182 million RUFC figure.

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      1. ^^
        ‘(The following Resource Summary rows are for informational purposes only. The corresponding budget requests are documented elsewhere.)’

        Look at the actual budget section on page 3. Specifically ‘Non recurring flyaway costs’. Total the figures under unit cost column. $120 million for 2014. $112 million for 2015.

        Its a COMPLETE breakdown of the costs involved covering each heading: airframe, electronics, engine and ‘engineering change orders’.

        ‘when you account for its creative accounting (a.k.a. lying)’

        And how did YOU calculate that exactly $40,400,000 per aircraft of ‘fraud’ was committed? ‘Creative accounting’ can be used to justify greater funding for the same work, not lower funding (as in this case).

        Fact is, the $180M figure was the PROCUREMENT cost and that is well documented in budget statements. It includes initial spares as well as support expenditure such as for ground support equipment, training equipment, full mission simulators etc.

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  3. It would be ideal. My personal ideal would be:
    – private ownership of small business (family business, basically)
    – collective ownership of large business
    – state ownership of strategically important business (arms industry etc.) with possibility of privately and collectively owned firms (so there will always be a state-owned small arms factory, for example, but nothing will prevent privately-owned factory from submitting its own designs for a competition)

    We had something similar in India (pre 1991 reforms). Didn’t work out too well for us. (Though dealing with crony capitalism now isn’t pleasant either.)

    Small businesses will have low incentive to grow beyond a point with the threat of nationalisation looming at the end. Leads to stagnation.
    Collective ownership of large business – inefficient administration. With no significant shareholders appointing a board of directors.to oversee the company is mug’s game. Plus small shares made the less likely to be traded on the market – less interest from investors. Eventually the company’s workers will come to be only ownership block. Good for the workers over the short term, bad for the company’s prospects over the long term.
    State ownership of strategic businesses – still that way in India. Govt’s biased towards state companies who as a consequence operate quite inefficiently (no profit motive, no bankruptcy fear), while the private sector gets squeezed and eventually quits the industry.

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    1. The issue here is that you need good government that is long-term oriented. Japan had it in the rapid growth period. Taiwan and South Korea, although authoritarian, had very long term and well planned governments.

      Note that China too has a very authoritarian regime, but it’s better managed than most nations. That’s why I think China has managed to avoid some of the difficulties that India has faced. Also note that since the 1980s, SOEs (state owned enterprises withdrew), then they began to re-emerge around 2005 and are now a potent force within.

      It’s heavily dependent on having a good long term government I think more than anything else.

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      1. “We had something similar in India (pre 1991 reforms). ”
        Stop right there. Giving India as an example of why a system might not work is wrong, as India has very bad management at all levels. Only in the last year (2013) just in the military there have been severe shortcomings, with several ships catching fire, development programs that fail to achieve their goals, western industry that is not convinced that India industry can handle license production of complex western designs (Rafale), Russian industry that is also not convinced that Indian industry can handle complex Russian designs (submarines, maintenance for warships etc.) etc. The fact that the system outlined by picard hasn’t worked in India has nothing to do with the system itself, as it’s working today in China, Taiwan, South Korea, is working with no sign of being stopped in Japan for the past century and a half since Japan has entered the industrial age and was working perfectly fine prior to WWII in the western world for more the a century. No the system didn’t work in India because of inherent problems of India society and economy, mainly rampant corruption, which transcends economic systems as you yourself point out when you say “. (Though dealing with crony capitalism now isn’t pleasant either.)”

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      2. Andrei,

        Oh save it. I more than well acquainted with Britain’s experience with nationalization as well. ‘Sick man of Europe’ for most of the 70s.

        As for ‘THIS system’ working out in China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, pray tell (aside from the railways many decades ago) which industry/company was nationalized in these countries?

        Mitsubishi. Kawasaki. IHI. Fuji HI. Hyundai. Daewoo. Samsung Techwin. KAI. All defence contractors. State owned?

        Like

      3. Chris,

        In the early years, you had just as good government in India under Nehru as Taiwan and South Korea (Japan was already an industrialized state so I wouldn’t include it). Better probably. And more idealistic. But eventually the lofty ideals of Fabian socialism ran to into reality… in about the same time-frame as they did in the UK.

        China’s SOEs do have a behemothian character but the ‘China story’, as it were, has been driven overwhelmingly by the private sector. And the latter’s true for Taiwan, South Korea and Japan as well. That the SOEs have emerged as huge entities is a result of China’s growth not a cause. (Also they haven’t reduced China’s income equality either. Its Gini Index rivals the US and growing.)

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      4. “In the early years, you had just as good government in India under Nehru as Taiwan and South Korea (Japan was already an industrialized state so I wouldn’t include it). Better probably. And more idealistic. But eventually the lofty ideals of Fabian socialism ran to into reality… in about the same time-frame as they did in the UK.”

        Interesting. You won’t compare Japan because it was already “industrialized”, but you bring the UK to support your argument. Talk about selective usage of facts.

        On the contrary, the UK made a series of serious missteps throughout the 1960s and 1970s. I think Thatcher, although she did solve some things – made things far worse in other areas, such as financial de-regulation and essentially being a nail in the coffin for what was then an already declining UK manufacturing sector. It could be argued that many of the decisions made by the Thatcher government have set things in motion for the UK’s fall during the financial crisis, and its stagnant economy today.

        I don’t think you quite understand how the East Asian economies work. Although privately owned, the state has a lot of influence over their long term direction. A lot more than in most nations in the Western world. The government may not decide day to day operations, but they do work very closely with the major corporations. Judging by what you are saying, you don’t seem to pay a lot of attention to China either. As indicated, the state owned companies have been re-emerging.

        Also, note that they are not as profit-oriented (ex: shareholder above all else) as Western corporations. Even in the 1980s, most Japanese corporations were not very profitable. That said, there are exceptions. At the moment, Samsung seems to be quite profitable, but that may be ephemeral.

        There’s flaws in both models – a Soviet style command economy and an American style free market economy. Witness the current difficulties the US is facing. Many of them are because of a blind ideological adherence to free markets.

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      5. ‘Interesting. You won’t compare Japan because it was already “industrialized”, but you bring the UK to support your argument. Talk about selective usage of facts.’

        Won’t compare? Those weren’t MY words. I said won’t INCLUDE it in the list of countries that were better governed at the time.

        ‘On the contrary, the UK made a series of serious missteps throughout the 1960s and 1970s. I think Thatcher, although she did solve some things – made things far worse in other areas, such as financial de-regulation and essentially being a nail in the coffin for what was then an already declining UK manufacturing sector. It could be argued that many of the decisions made by the Thatcher government have set things in motion for the UK’s fall during the financial crisis, and its stagnant economy today.’

        ‘Series of misteps’ – that’s sounds like a glossing over of the reasons behind the mess that Thatcher inherited. We’re talking about the absolute nadir of the British economy unsurpassed by even the Great Depression or the 2008 recession.

        As for ‘UK’s fall and stagnant economy’ its hardly in much worse condition than (non-Thatcher) France. Inequality is only slight worse (32.3 to 31.1 on the Gini Index), GDP (PPP) per capita is higher, economic growth is MUCH higher and unemployment is FAR lower than France (6.8% vs 10.4%).

        ‘I don’t think you quite understand how the East Asian economies work. Although privately owned, the state has a lot of influence over their long term direction. A lot more than in most nations in the Western world. The government may not decide day to day operations, but they do work very closely with the major corporations.’

        I’m aware of how they work. And the prescription from the above (assuming its adopted as a model) would logically be that western govts should work more closely with its large corporations rather than identify private ownership of corporations as the core problem.

        ‘Judging by what you are saying, you don’t seem to pay a lot of attention to China either. As indicated, the state owned companies have been re-emerging.’

        Are these reemerging companies innovative? Are they market leaders? Are they more efficient at managing capital than the private sector? Or are they emerging in non-competitive sectors, with government funding, subsidies and regulatory privileges and posting far higher percentage of losses making units than the private sector?

        ‘Also, note that they are not as profit-oriented (ex: shareholder above all else) as Western corporations. Even in the 1980s, most Japanese corporations were not very profitable. That said, there are exceptions. At the moment, Samsung seems to be quite profitable, but that may be ephemeral.’

        Japanese corporate profits have been fairly low over the last two decades primarily because growth has been low. Even in the 80s it was around 4%, not radically lower than the 5% averaged by US corporations (can also be partially explained as a result of lower investment/expansion rate for the latter).

        ‘There’s flaws in both models – a Soviet style command economy and an American style free market economy. Witness the current difficulties the US is facing. Many of them are because of a blind ideological adherence to free markets.’

        Far be it from me to suggest that the US capitalist model is issue free. MY assertion is that this simplistic alternative model proposed here (private->collective->state ownership) is NOT the hoped for easy solution to the problems faced by western economies today.

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    2. “- Small businesses will have low incentive to grow beyond a point with the threat of nationalisation looming at the end. Leads to stagnation.”

      You’re mixing things up here. Nationalization is when state takes over the business, but collective ownership is not nationalization.

      “- Collective ownership of large business – inefficient administration.”

      Considering that private ownership oftentimes leads to administration that is quite inefficient in everything except layoffs, that is not a good argument. Unregulated private ownership led (amoong other things) to the Great Depression, devastated South American economies…

      “- State ownership of strategic businesses – still that way in India. Govt’s biased towards state companies who as a consequence operate quite inefficiently (no profit motive, no bankruptcy fear), while the private sector gets squeezed and eventually quits the industry.”

      State ownership does not mean that state should just loan money to company if it is inefficient.

      Like

      1. ‘You’re mixing things up here. Nationalization is when state takes over the business, but collective ownership is not nationalization.’

        Small private business grows to become big business. How do you propose to de-privatise it without nationalization?

        ‘Considering that private ownership oftentimes leads to administration that is quite inefficient in everything except layoffs, that is not a good argument. Unregulated private ownership led (amoong other things) to the Great Depression, devastated South American economies…’

        Well.. this argument stops just short of advocating (partial?) communism. Private ownership may have caused the Great Depression and recessions in South America but it also led to 60 years of wealth addition and a massive fall in global poverty.

        ‘State ownership does not mean that state should just loan money to company if it is inefficient.’

        What is a state owned company’s basic incentive to operate efficiently?

        If its providing a (fundamentally unprofitable) public service (like railways or roads), its one thing.But since the govt does not rely on profits from SOEs to make ends meet, in all other sectors, oversight will never be as effective as that by a board of directors appointed by shareholders. And the govt WILL continue to loan money to inefficient entities because the govt (being the primary shareholder) will be forced to write off that capital, if the company goes belly-up.

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      2. “Small private business grows to become big business. How do you propose to de-privatise it without nationalization?”

        Buyout. Either state can buy it and then allow workers to buy it from the state, or workers pay in sums and once total paid reaches value of the company, ownership is transferred.

        “but it also led to 60 years of wealth addition and a massive fall in global poverty.”

        Private ownership, whenever not heavily regulated, always led to massive rise in poverty and concentration of wealth in hands of very few. See Latin American “experiment” (led by Friedman’s students, no less) and US for examples.

        “And the govt WILL continue to loan money to inefficient entities because the govt (being the primary shareholder) will be forced to write off that capital, if the company goes belly-up.”

        Not necessarily. Number one, inefficient private firms often get just as many loans as inefficient state-owned firms simply because it is better to have some production than massive unemployment – state is at loss either way, but former means that some services still exist. Number two, private firms loan money from banks if they’re in trouble, and banks themselves are propped up by taxpayers’ money, so in the end it comes down to the same thing.

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  4. “‘Series of misteps’ – that’s sounds like a glossing over of the reasons behind the mess that Thatcher inherited. We’re talking about the absolute nadir of the British economy unsurpassed by even the Great Depression or the 2008 recession. ”

    The UK was already a nation in decline in the aftermath of WWII, losing what remained of its empire, and was widely viewed as a declining power.

    But at home, one must look at the domestic situation. Manufacturing in particular was in rapid decline after around the 1960s. Thatcher if anything, accelerated the decline. Northern England has never recovered from the magnitude of the decline.

    As far as Thatcher’s policies, I stand by what I said. Although there were some necessary changes she made, she did not fix the most serious long term problems. Instead, she accelerated the decline of the UK’s manufacturing, de-regulated the banking sector and set things in motion for the current crisis. I would hardly consider her “victory” over the Falklands Islands to be substantial (how many people in the Uk would even be able to find that place on a map of the world off the top of their heads?).

    Regarding France, I did not say that France was the shining beacon for the world to follow. Germany, and some of the Scandinavian nations would be closer (although again imperfect) to what I consider ideals worthy of emulation.

    “I’m aware of how they work. And the prescription from the above (assuming its adopted as a model) would logically be that western govts should work more closely with its large corporations rather than identify private ownership of corporations as the core problem.”

    I fail to see why this would not be a bad thing.

    In the long run, it would ironically benefit such corporations. The economy would grow at a faster rate. Corporate revenues in turn would also grow.

    “Are these reemerging companies innovative? Are they market leaders? Are they more efficient at managing capital than the private sector? Or are they emerging in non-competitive sectors, with government funding, subsidies and regulatory privileges and posting far higher percentage of losses making units than the private sector?”

    It depends on what you define as market leader. At the moment, China is not a market leader in technology (although a case could be made that certain areas, China is beginning to punch above its weight – look at the Beijing Genomics Institute for example is a state owned enterprise that has made some noteworthy achievements in genome sequencing). However, they are leaders in volume.

    Off the top of my head, in the service industry, a case could be made that Singapore Airlines is a world leader in well quality of aircraft service. It’s interesting to note that lately, many of the challengers from the Arabic world like Emirates are also state owned or have heavy state investments.

    “Japanese corporate profits have been fairly low over the last two decades primarily because growth has been low. Even in the 80s it was around 4%, not radically lower than the 5% averaged by US corporations (can also be partially explained as a result of lower investment/expansion rate for the latter).”

    That’s the thing. Capitalism measures corporate progress by its profits. Only a small percentage of any population is going to own stock – all the more so since pensions are becoming tighter or in some areas, non-existent altogether.

    A better measure would be the contributions of any corporation to their home nation and their ability to provide productive, well-paying career opportunities to a nation. Note that profits are only a by-product of this.

    An example of contributions could be R&D. In the case of Japan, it has one of the world’s highest, bested only be South Korea and Israel. In truth, this probably underestimates South Korea and Japan. Israel probably spends the bulk of its R&D on military spending, not say, advanced manufacturing prowess. Similar thoughts about the US, but also certain things like “website design” are counted often.

    “Far be it from me to suggest that the US capitalist model is issue free. MY assertion is that this simplistic alternative model proposed here (private->collective->state ownership) is NOT the hoped for easy solution to the problems faced by western economies today.”

    I did not say “state ownership” in a Soviet sense. I said it in a East Asian sense.

    Day to day decisions are made by the company, and by executives
    Companies serve the country. No questions. Nothing like American corporations who claim they are “global”
    The state has considerable control over the long term direction of the company
    Strong emphasis on private-public partnerships, with very high spending on R&D, infrastructure, and other capital investments
    Partnerships with unions, with both sides legitimately protecting each others long term interests
    Profits are merely the byproduct – aim is to break even, but maximizing profits at all costs is not the top priority
    Company is very long-term oriented and willing to sacrifice short-term profits/goals to achieve long term objectives

    It is not a perfect model. There are for example East Asian companies that struggle. Sony is an example. In China, there are many non-performing loans that have been lent out – so many that some speculate a banking crisis could someday occur.

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